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SALMON AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT:
LESSONS FROM TIE COLUMBIA BASIN
Michael C. Blumm* & Greg D. Corbint
Abstract. Within the last decade, the Columbia Basin, once home to the world's largest
salmon runs, has witnessed numerous listings of its signature natural resource under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA). These listings have propelled the ESA into the forefront of land
and water use decisionmaking across a vast landscape of the Pacific Northwest This Article
examines the Columbia Basin salmon listings and their aftermath. Specifically, it considers the
effect of the ESA's consultation requirements on hydroelectric, hatchery, harvest, and habitat
decisionmaking. The Article draws several lessons from this examination, many of them
surprising, including the assertion that the listings have produced many innovations in the
implementation of the statute but few improvements in the condition of listed Columbia Basin
salmon, due to the persistent sensitivity of consultation process to economic concerns. The Article
concludes that this reluctance to disturb ongoing activities damaging salmon does not bode well
for the continued existence of the most imperiled of the species, the Snake River runs.
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INTRODUCTION

Pacific salmon are the Northwest's signature natural resource. Unlike the
northern spotted owl, salmon are economically prized, have been the subject
of numerous "fish fights" over the years,' and were the foundation of the
bargain that allowed peaceful settlement of the region.2 Columbia River
salmon, historically the largest of the Northwest's salmon runs, have been
in decline for over a century due to overharvesting, hydroelectric
development, poor hatchery practices, and habitat degradation.' Lately,
however, Columbia River salmon have become the subject of the most
expensive biological restoration program in the history of the world.4
That restoration program, initiated in 1982, failed to deliver its promise
of restoring harvestable runs for a variety of reasons, including flawed
design, lack of enforcement, and lack of authority over many harvest
management and habitat-damaging activities.5 By the early 1990s, the
American Fisheries Society's Endangered Species Committee reported a
Pacific Coast-wide salmon crisis: 101 naturally spawning salmon species
faced "a high risk of extinction," another 58 had a "moderate risk of

1. See, e.g., Courtland L. Smith, Oregon FishFights (Or. St U. Sea Grant, Pub. No. ORESU-T-740041, 1974).
2. See Fay G. Cohen, Treaties on Trial: The ContinuingControversy over Northwest Indian Fishing
Rights 31, 37-39 (1986); Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty PiscaryProfitand
HabitatProtection in the Pacific Northwest: A PropertyRights Approach, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 407,
420-33 (1998) [hereinafter Blumm & Swift, PiscaryProfit].
3. See generally The Northwest Salmon Crisis: A Documentary History (Joseph Cone & Sandy
Ridlington eds., 1996) [hereinafter Northwest Salmon Crisis].
4. The program was authorized by section 4(h) of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plauming and
Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (1984). See Michael C. Blumm & Andy Simrin, The
Unraveling ofthe Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and EndangeredSpecies in the Columbia
Basin, 21 Envtl. L. 657, 662-70 (1991) [hereinafter Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity].
5. See Blumm. & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supranote 4, at 711-13, 727-34.
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extinction," and 54 were labeled "of special concern." 6 About one-third of
these fish runs were native to the Columbia Basin.7
This bleak situation prompted the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe to file a
petition seeking to list Snake River sockeye under the Endangered Species

Act (ESA)' in March 1990. Two months later, a coalition of environmental
groups filed petitions seeking to list Columbia Basin spring, summer, and
fall chinook, and lower basin coho.9 These petitions and the subsequent
listings ushered in the era of the ESA in Pacific salmon restoration. The
effects are still being felt today. In fact, perhaps no other species has
received as much sustained ESA attention over such an immense landscape
and waterscape. As of this writing, there are twenty-three salmon runs,
referred to by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) as
"evolutionarily significant units,"'0 now listed under the ESA, covering an
area from southern California to the Canadian border." Among other things,
6. Willa Nehlsen et al.,
Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:Stocks at Riskfrom California,Oregon,
Idaho, and Washington, 16 Fisheries no. 2, at 4-5, 7-8 (1991). Although this report was published in
1991, it was begun in 1987, and pre-publication copies were generally available some time prior to
publication. See Northwest Salmon Crisis, supranote 3, at 296. After publication, the article quickly
became one of the most heavily cited publications in the history of the American Fisheries Society. See
id at 299.
7. See Nehlsen et al.,
supranote 6, at 10.
8. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
9. See infra notes 56,64,71, and accompanying text; see also Blumm & Simin, UnravelingParity,
supra note 4, at 714. Upper basin coho were extinct by 1990. See Nehlsen et al., supra note 6, at 14.
10. See infra notes 43,50, and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 118 and accompanying text; 55 Fed. Reg. 12,831 (1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.11(h) (1998)) (Sacramento River winter-run chinook (emergency listing)); 55 Fed. Reg. 46,515
(1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(e) (1998)) (Sacramento River winter-run chinook (classified as
threatened)); 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998)) (Snake River
sockeye); 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(g)-(h) (1998)) (Snake River
spring/summer chinook and Snake River fall chinook); 59 Fed. Reg. 440 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 222.23(a) (1998)) (Sacramento River winter-rn chinook (reclassified as endangered)); 59 Fed. Reg.
42,529 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998)) (Snake River spring/summer chinook and
Snake River fall chinook (emergency interim rule)); 60 Fed. Reg. 19,342 (1995) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 227.4(f)-(g) (1998)) (Snake River spring/summer chinook and Snake River fall chinook (final
listing)); 61 Fed. Reg. 56,138 (1996) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(h), 227.21(a)-(b) (1998)) (central
California coast coho (threatened)); 62 Fed. Reg. 1296 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(h) (1998))
(central California coast coho (threatened) (correction)); 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (1997) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 227.4(i) (1998)) (southern Oregon/northern California coast coho (threatened)); 62 Fed. Reg.
43,937 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4(j)-() (1998)) (West Coast steelhead
(threatened and endangered)); 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(m)-(n) (1998))
(steelhead (threatened)); 63 Fed. Reg. 42,587 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(o) (1998)) (Oregon
coast coho (threatened)); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.102(a)(16)(18), 224.101(a)) (Washington and Oregon chinook (threatened and endangered)); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508
(1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(12)-(13)) (chum); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,517 (1999) (to be
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these listings have given NMFS, an agency with little regulatory experience

in freshwater areas, 2 effective regulatory control over a host of
hydroelectric, hatchery, harvest, and habitat-damaging activities. This

dramatic expansion in regulatory control has transformed NMFS into an
agency with major land and water management decisionmaking authority
throughout the coastal West. 3 In addition, this expansion has made clear
that notions that the ESA is all substance and no procedure, and all science
and no economics, are myths.14 In truth, the salmon experience with the

ESA reveals the statute to be procedurally complex and quite economically
sensitive in its effects on land and water use decisionmaking.

This Article explores the ESA in the context of salmon restoration,
focusing particularly on Columbia Basin salmon because most of the ESA's
salmon experience has been in the Columbia Basin and because the stakes
are extremely high. The Article spotlights the federal consultation process

required by section 7 of the ESA because that process has elevated NMFS
to a prominent role in salmon restoration efforts. It is true that the statute's
proscription against "takes" of listed salmon 5 will also have major effects
on land and
water use decisionmaking, but most of those effects have yet
6
to be felt.'

codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(14)-(15)) (steelhead (threatened)); 64 Fed. Reg. 14,528 (1999) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(19)) (sockeye (threatened)).
12. NMFS does have regulatory authority under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994). NMFS shares authority under the ESA with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service; under an intergovernmental agreement, NMFS has ESA authority concerning anadromous fish
(fish that spawn in freshwater but spend a portion of their adult life in salt water) like salmon. See 51
Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986).
13. See infra notes 491-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 495-99 (discussing vague substance of biological opinions (BiOps)); infra notes
511-14 (discussing "streamlining" process of BiOps); infra notes 532-35 (discussing economic
sensitivity in BiOps).
15. The "take"prohibition, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994), gives NMFS substantial authority over private
activities. See infra notes 16, 213, and accompanying text. On the effect ofthe "take" prohibition, see
generally Daniel . Rohlt The EndangeredSpecies Act: A Guide to Its Protectionsand Implementation
59-77 (1989); Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supra note 4, at 721-22.
16. BiOps may include "incidental take statements," indirectly authorizing nonfederal "takes" of
listed species that occur in connection with a federal agency action or a federal license or permit. See
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(B) (1994); see also Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996); James C.
Kilbourne, The EndangeredSpecies Act Under the Microscope:A Closeup Lookfrom a Litigator's
Perspective,21 Envtl. L. 499, 553-56 (1991).
Nonfederal "incidental takes" may also be authorized through "incidental take permits" under section
10 of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1994). Although these permits require preparation of a
"habitat conservation plan" (HCP), there are advantages to authorizing "takes" in this manner. Under
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Part II of the Article explains the decisions to list the Columbia River
Basin salmon runs for ESA protection, including NMFS's controversial
concept of "evolutionarily significant unit," as well as its decisions,
subsequently overturned in federal courts, not to list two salmonid species.
Part III examines a number of NMFS's biological opinions, the chief means
by which NMFS exerts its ESA land and water decisionmaking authority
over federal activities after listing. The Article then explores, in turn, the
effects of those opinions on Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations,
hatchery practices, harvest regulations, and habitat management. Part III
also shows that NMFS, now the central player in salmon restoration efforts,
has employed its authority in a manner designed to minimize the ESA's
effects on ongoing activities that damage listed salmon. Part IV explains the
lessons learned from the ESA's effects on salmon restoration efforts,
including effects on the salmon, NMFS, and the implementation of the
statute. Part V concludes that the marriage between the ESA and salmon
restoration efforts has forever changed both interpretation of the statute and
management of the species, but notes that the ESA has yet to produce any
demonstrable improvement of the salmon runs. Prospects for the future,
especially with respect to the most imperiled of the listed salmon species,
the Snake River salmon, are not especially promising.

the "no surprises" policy, the nonfederal entity may be assured that it will not be required to undertake
or to pay for any measures not contained in the HCP for the life of the HCP, which can be 50 years or
longer. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5) (1998). Moreover, because the nonfederal entity prepares the HCP,
it may be able to preserve more flexibility in designing and implementing conservation measures than
in the case of federally promulgated BiOps, particularly because the ESA requires HCPs only to
"minimize and mitigate" takings of listed species "to the maximum extent practicable." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Dam operators on the mid-Columbia have apparently decided that the benefits of these provisions
outweigh the costs of HCP preparation and are proceeding to apply for a section 10 permit. See infra
note 484; Margaret Hollenbach, Mid-Columbia Salmon Plans Celebrated,5 Columbia Basin Bull. 2
(July 9, 1998) <http://www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull_05.htm> (discussing near-completion of 50-yearlong HCP on operation of three mid-Columbia dams). In the case of threatened species, which include
several listed Columbia Basin salmon runs, the "take" prohibition does not apply unless incorporated
into a conservation regulation authorized by section 4(d) of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
In such situations, HCPs are unnecessary because there is no statutory prohibition on "taking" threatened
species. It also seems likely that section 4(d) conservation regulations will authorize "takes" that are
consistent with state conservation plans, like the Oregon coho plan, which will effectively obviate the
need for private entities to produce HCPs. See infra notes 193-212 and accompanying text.
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II.

THE LISTINGS

The salmon runs of the Columbia River Basin were once so abundant
that they were "nothing short of fabulous." 7 For centuries before European
settlement, Native American civilizations thrived in the basin, relying on
salmon as the mainstay of their diet."8 The settlement of the region by white
Europeans brought increasing pressures on the salmon resource. The advent
of cannery technology spurred an explosion in the commercial fishing
industry in the late 1800s. 9 Transcontinental railroads with refrigerated cars
brought fresh salmon to distant markets, and gasoline-powered ocean
trollers advanced harvest technology." By the turn of the century the basin's
salmon runs were greatly diminished,
and the commercial fishing industry
2
had already begun to falter. '
The Columbia River still had a major role to play in transforming the
region's economy, however, and this role severely affected its alreadydiminished salmon runs. The basin's immense river flows were ripe for
hydroelectric development, which would change the region's resourceextractive economy into a more diverse economy with an industrial base.'
With Congress's approval to begin building a massive hydroelectric
infrastructure, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers set out to tame the river.'
The damming of the Columbia Basin forever blocked salmon from well
over a thousand river miles of their historic habitat.2 4 Where they were not
completely blocked, salmon were forced to traverse manmade passageways
and slack-water reservoirs. Eventually, the pressures became too much: too
little habitat remained for some species to survive.' Many runs that did
survive were critically imperiled and in need of immediate attention. 6
17. Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian:Land, Waterand the Futureofthe West 184
(1992) (describing early impressions of white settlers that rivers ran so thick with fish "that a person
could cross a stream by walking across their backs").
18. See Blumm & Swift, PiscaryProfit,supranote 2, at 433-34.
19. See Northwest Salmon Crisis,supra note 3, at 9-10; Cohen, supra note 2, at 40-4 1.
20. See Northwest Salmon Crisis,supra note 3, at 9-11.
21. See id.at 12.

22. See id. at 12-15.
23. The Corps's first hydroelectric project on the Columbia River was the Bonneville Dam, begun
in 1933 after the Corps recommended constructing 10 major works in the basin. See id. at 95-98.
24. Construction of Grand Coulee Dam in Washington State alone blocked around 1100 miles of
spawning habitat See id. at 13.
25. Habitat destruction by a variety of means is a factor in the decline of all listed Columbia and
Snake River salmon. See infra notes 51-212 (discussing reasons for the listings).
26. See Nehlsen et al., supra note 6, at 4, 8-11.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:519, 1999

As early as 1978, the NMFS and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) began a comprehensive status review of upriver salmon populations
to determine whether to list them under the ESA. Two years later the
fisheries agencies postponed the status review in the wake of Congress's
passage of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning
Act,28 a bold attempt to mitigate damage to fish and wildlife "to the extent
affected by the development and operation" of the hydropower system.29
Unfortunately, that Act's attempt to elevate fish and wildlife to "co-equal
partners" with hydropower" did not result in restored salmon runs. In 1990,
the NMFS confirmed that salmon were in desperate trouble when it listed
the first Columbia Basin salmon as endangered under the ESA.3 Since then
many other species have been listed; more are likely to follow.
Before a species falls under the protective umbrella of the ESA, it must
be listed as either endangered or threatened. The ESA defines as
"endangered" any species "in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range; 3 2 "threatened" species are those "likely to
' Using only the "best scientific and commercial
become... endangered."33
34
'
data available," the agency considers five factors in determining whether
a species warrants listing."5 These factors are (1) habitat loss or
modification, (2) overharvesting, (3) disease or predation, (4) inadequate
regulatory protection, and (5) other natural or manmade factors.36
In the case of Pacific salmon, the listing process usually begins with a
citizen petition, triggering a statutory duty to take action.3 7 Within ninety
days of the petition, the agency must, "[t]o the maximum extent
practicable," make a determination "as to whether the petition presents
substantial scientific or commercial information indicating that [a listing is]
27. See 43 Fed. Reg. 45,628 (1978); F. Lorraine Bodi, ProtectingColumbia RiverSalmon Underthe
EndangeredSpecies Act, 10 Envtl. L. 349, 349-50 (1980).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 839b (1994).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A); see also Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution
of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia Basin, 24 Ecology L.Q. 653, 660 (1997) [hereinafter
Blumm, Amphibious Salmon].
30. Blumm, Amphibious Salmon, supra note 29, at 660-61.
31. See infra notes 56-63, 72-82, and accompanying text.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1994).
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1994).
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).

37. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
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' If so, the agency immediately begins a status review of the
warranted."38
species and, within twelve months of receiving the petition, determines that
the listing is (1) not warranted, (2) warranted, or (3) warranted but
precluded by a listing backlog 9 A "warranted but precluded" finding is
treated as a new petition, so that the listing agency must revisit the issue
every twelve months and make a new determination.'
Given that the ESA is now over a quarter-century old, it is surprising that
the decision whether to list a species often turns on the threshold question
of what constitutes a "species." The ESA defines a species as including
"any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population
segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when
mature."'" By including subcategories of a species in the definition,
Congress established a policy of protecting local populations important to
a species' overall survival.42 How NMFS implements that policy, however,
is controversial.
In the context of Pacific salmon, NMFS employs the concept of an
"evolutionarily significant unit" (ESU) to determine if there is a "distinct
population segment" eligible for listing.43 To be considered an ESU, a
population must (1) be "substantially reproductively isolated from other
conspecific population units," and (2) "represent an important component
in the evolutionary legacy of the species."' The major criticism of NMFS's
ESU concept is that, both as a matter of biology and policy, it fails to
respond to Congress's intent to protect both species and the ecosystems on
which they depend.45 For example, the ESU policy constrains NMFS's
ability to protect genetically connected populations that "can contribute to
the genetic diversity and hence persistence of an entire species."'
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(i) (1994).
41. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994).
42. See Daniel J. Rohlt There's Something Fishy Going on Here: A Critiqueof theNationalMarine
Fisheries Service's Definition of Species Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 24 Envtl. L. 617, 632

(1994).
43. 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612,58,612 (1991).

44. Id. at 58,621.
45. See Rohlf, supra note 42, at 640-42. By focusing almost exclusively on the ESA's policy to

maintain genetic diversity within populations, NMFS's ESU policy ignores other equally important
policies like protecting healthy ecosystems, maintaining management flexibility where science is
uncertain, and conserving local populations threatened with extirpation even where the species is
abundant in other areas. See id. at 636-51.
46. Id. at 638.
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Moreover, by requiring reproductive isolation as a factor in the definition,
the policy "ignores [Congress's] clear intent that NMFS and FWS should
have authority to protect the U.S. population of a species even if that
species was abundant elsewhere in the world."47 Thus, a species threatened

with extinction in the lower forty-eight states, but reproductively connected
to stable populations in Canada, would not qualify as an ESU. Nor does the
policy account for the ESA's ecosystem protections, because it focuses on
populations in isolation from their surrounding community. 4 As discussed
below, many salmonid ESUs now enjoy the ESA's protections,49 but NMFS
has also used the ESU concept to deny other salmon runs protection under
the Act."
A.

Columbia Basin Salmon

1.

Snake River Sockeye

A century of declining salmon runs in the Columbia Basin led to Snake
River sockeye being the first Columbia River Basin salmon species listed
for protection under the ESA.5 Historically, sockeye spawned in numerous

47. Id. at 642.
48. Professor Rohlfprovided the following hypothetical to illustrate the point:
For instance, both sockeye and kokanee salmon inhabit Redfish Lake in Idaho. The former variety
migrates downriver as juveniles 900 miles to the ocean, where these fish spend their adult lives
before making the return journey to spawn; kokanee salmon, on the other hand, remain in the lake
or its inlet for their entire lives. NMFS listed sockeye as endangered only after determining that
these fish were probably reproductively isolated and genetically different from kokanee. Had NMFS
not found that sockeye met both of these criteria, the agency would have lumped them into an ESU
with kokanee, and would not have listed the ESU had it found the kokanee population secure. In
this case, sockeye could even become extinct without triggering ESA concerns since the ESA would
not prohibit dam construction or other activities downstream from the lake so long as the lakedwelling portion of the ESU remained healthy.
Id. at 641-42 (citations omitted).
49. See infra notes 51-212 and accompanying text.
50. An example of NMFS deciding not to list a salmonid species based on its ESU concept is the
Illinois River winter steelhead. Lacking conclusive scientific data distinguishing the population
genetically from other steelhead, and declining to consider environmental threats specific to the Illinois
River population, NIvIFS denied a listing. See 58 Fed. Reg. 29,390, 29,391 (1993); Rohlf, supra note
42, at 648 (critiquing NMFS's application of its ESU concept). Another example is the Columbia River
coho. See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (1991). Recently, NMFS and the Fish and Wildlife Service have
suggested that the Umpqua River cutthroat trout may be removed from the ESA list by combining the
Umpqua ESU with an ESU comprised of cutthroat trout from rivers in southwestern Washington. See
infra note 432 and accompanying text.
51. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,619 (1991).

Salmon and the Endangered Species Act
Idaho lakes in the Salmon and Wallowa sub-basins, within the Snake River
Basin." In the late 1800s, Snake Basin sockeye fed a strong commercial
fishery around many of the species' spawning lakes, but those fisheries
eventually disappeared after agricultural diversions of water and dam

construction blocked their upstream migration.53 Escapements' of Snake

Basin sockeye in the latter half of this century have fluctuated, but they
zero returning sockeye were
eventually plummeted to the point where
55
counted at Lower Granite Dam in 1990.
In 1990, at the nadir of the species' decline, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe
petitioned NMFS to list Snake River sockeye as endangered under the
ESA. 6 Almost immediately, NMFS initiated a status review of sockeye that

led to the agency's decision to propose listing the species as endangered.57
Some comments on the proposal challenged the status of Snake River
sockeye as a species under the ESA, 5' while others identified a host of
potential anthropogenic causes of the species' endangerment. 59 NMFS
responded that Snake River sockeye are a separate ESU and are therefore
appropriate for ESA protection, and identified what it considered to be the
factors most affecting the species. While commercial overharvesting likely

precipitated the initial dramatic declines, other factors now dominate,
52. Sockeye are unique among the Columbia Basin salmon in that they spawn in lakes instead of
stream beds and make the longest journey back to their natal spawning habitat of any North American
salmonid. See Keith C. Petersen, River ofLife, Channel ofDeath:Fish andDams on the Lower Snake
193 (1995). Sockeye once spawned in Alturas, Pettit, Redfish, Yellowbelly, and Stanley Lakes in the
Stanley Basin of the Salmon River, in Little Redfish Lake on Redfish Creek, and in Big Payette Lake
and Wallowa Lake on the Payette and Wallowa Rivers, respectively. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622.
53. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622.
54. Escapement generally means fish that "escape" from harvests. In the Columbia Basin, those fish
that escape to spawn also survive hazardous downstream and upstream river migrations. See Michael
C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's Anadromous Fish
Resourcesfora Peaceful Coexistence with the FederalColumbia RiverPower System, 11 Envt. L. 211,
216-21 (1981) [hereinafter Blumm, Hydropowervs. Salmon].
55. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622.
56. See id.at 58,619.
57. NMFS moved quickly to list Snake River sockeye. The status review began one week after the
petition was filed. See id.Two months later, NMFS published notice that there was substantial evidence
to wan-ant a listing. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (1990). A NMFS technical report on the status of sockeye
and the proposed rule followed soon after. See 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055 (1991).
58. The ESA defines a species as including "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any
distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). NMFS considers a salmon population as a "distinct population segmene'
capable of listing if the population represents an ESU of the species. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (1991).
See Rohlf, supranote 42, at 636-51, for detailed criticism of the ESU concept
59. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,619-21.
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including hydropower development on the Columbia and Snake Rivers;' °
water withdrawals for irrigation and storage;6 increased predation by
northern squawfish, marine mammals, and birds; and natural drought
cycles.62 NMFS listed the species in 1991, a year in which only four
sockeye returned to Redfish Lake.63
Snake River Spring/Summer and Fall Chinook

2.

The plight of Snake River spring/summer and fall chinook has been on
NMFS's agenda for nearly a decade. With the chinook's continued decline,
and the consequent close scrutiny given federal actions affecting all

Columbia River Basin salmonids, NMFS's role as a major regulatory player
in the region will likely extend well into the next millennium.

Less than six months after listing Snake River sockeye, in response to
another citizen petition, NMFS listed as threatened Snake River
spring/summer chinook and fall chinook.' At one point, Snake River
spring/summer chinook accounted for more than forty percent of all
chinook returns in the Columbia Basin, producing more than 1.5 million
fish per year in the late 1800s.65 The runs declined to less than ten percent
of their historic strength by the mid-1 900s, however, and they continued to

60. See id. Hydroelectric dams adversely affect salmon in a variety of ways. Dams can simply block
the fish from reaching their habitat, kill juveniles passing through the turbines, delay juvenile
downstream migration and adult upstream migration, and increase the likelihood of predation. See id.;
see also Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 54, at 216-21. For a history of hydroelectric
development of the Columbia Basin, see Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest's HydroelectricHeritage:
Prologueto the PacificNorthwest Conservation and ElectricPowerPlanningAct, 58 Wash. L. Rev.
175 (1983).
61. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 58,622.
62. See id. at 58,623. Increased predation from squawfish and birds is a direct result of dams. Water
impoundments behind the dams slow juvenile passage and create ideal forage habitat for squawfish. See
id. Those salmon that survive the gauntlet of reservoirs face additional risks of predation after passing
through the dams. Turbulence created by turbines, dam bypasses, and spillways disorient and confuse
migrating fish, making them easy prey for aquatic and avian predators. See id. Finally, if a salmon
migrant is able to navigate safely the Snake and Columbia Rivers, it can still fall prey to increasing
numbers of marine mammals along the West Coast See id. Nineteen-ninety was the fourth consecutive
drought year in the Snake River Basin. See id.
63. See idat 58,622.
64. See 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992). A coalition of environmental groups, led by Oregon Trout, filed
a petition to list Snake River chinook in May 1991. See id. at 14,654.
65. See id. at 14,659.
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fluctuate for another forty years. The species posted an all-time low in
1991, numbering less than one percent of their original 1.5 million.66

Fall chinook have fared no better. In 1901, construction of Swan Falls
Dam cut off returning adults from over one hundred miles of upstream

habitat.67 Despite this dramatic loss of habitat, the fall chinook population
stabilized at around 70,000 returning adults until the 1950s, when it

plummeted to less than half that number.68 From the late 1950s through
1975, dam construction further reduced fall chinook habitat to "only a
fraction of its former range."'69 In 1990, NMFS estimated wild fall chinook
escapement to Lower Granite Dam-the uppermost Snake River dam that

salmon can surmount-at only seventy-eight fish.7°

In 1990, a coalition of environmental organizations petitioned NMFS to

list separately spring chinook, summer chinook, and fall chinook. 1 NMFS

declined to list spring and summer chinook as separate ESUs, citing genetic

similarities and difficulty in clearly demarcating life history distinctions
between the two forms. Instead, NMFS listed the spring and summer runs
as a single ESU

2

The factors NMFS discussed as leading to the listing

mirrored those for sockeye,73 including hydropower development, water
66. The return of hatchery fish, commingled with wild fish, complicates the process of estimating the
size of wild salmon runs. For example, in 1991, 17,149 returning fish were counted at Ice Harbor Dam
on the Snake River, but estimated wild salmon returns were less than half that number. See id.
67. See id. at 14,660.
68. See id.
69. Id. Injust 25 years, nine dams were constructed along the Snake River, completely blocking or
inundating with reservoirs the vast majority of the species' spawning habitat. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 14,654.
72. See id.at 14,654-55, 14,658. NMFS's biologists concede that assessing evolutionary significance
is inherently uncertain. The two means for making the determination--observation of physical,
behavioral, and life history traits and direct DNA analysis-are limited by confounding environmental
and technical factors that scientists are unable to control. See Robin S. Waples, Definition ofSpecies
Under the'EndangeredSpecies Act: Applications to PacificSalmon, NOAA Technical Memorandum
NMFS F/NWC-194 (1991); Rohlf supranote 42, at 644-45. There are, however, distinct genetic and
life history differences between spring/summer chinook and fall chinook sufficient to support listing
them separately. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 14,658-59. Many comments to the proposed rule argued that both
species should each be listed as endangered rather than threatened. For spring/summer chinook, NMFS
dismissed the suggestion out-of-hand. For fall chinook, NMFS cited a one-year escapement increase
from 1990 to 1991 and improved management of hatchery fish to support its decision to list the species
as threatened rather than endangered. See id Other comments highlighted the effects of dam operations
on juvenile migration, harvest rates, hatchery operations, juvenile fish transportation, ineffective
management by other state and federal agencies, and adverse effects from activities on lands adjacent
to the rivers. See id. at 14,655-57.
73. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
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storage, water diversions for irrigation, siltation, and water pollution.74 As
with sockeye, NMFS stated that overharvesting played a key role in initial
declines, but hydropower development and its associated impacts formed
the core of current threats to the species.75
Alarmed by a punctuated decline in both spring/summer and fall
chinook, NMFS promulgated an emergency interim rule listing both species
as endangered in August 1994.76 Small population sizes for both species
presented an increased risk of extinction due to random demographic or
genetic events.77 NMFS noted that, contrary to its earlier expectations,
operational changes in the lower Snake and Columbia River dams,78
coupled with decreased harvest rates,7 9 had not restored salmon
populations. 0 The agency also noted an overall inadequacy of existing
regulatory mechanisms to increase the species' chances for survival.8
Generally, however, all the factors leading to listing a species as threatened
continued to be factors in the species' decline to endangered status. In
addition, NMFS emphasized two other possible causes: (1) the El Nifio
weather phenomenon and its associated changes in primary and secondary
ocean productivity could partially explain the decline of spring/summer
chinook; and (2) hatchery operations posed an additional threat to fall
2
chinook.1
Citing the same reasons as in the emergency rule, NMFS proposed to list
permanently both species as endangered in December 1994.3 Three years

74. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 14,660.
75. See id.
76. See 59 Fed. Reg. 42,529 (1994) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998)). The 1994 pre-season
estimate for spring/summer chinook was 49,000 returning adults. But by the end of the season, only
20,132 fish were counted at Bonneville Dam. Fall chinook also continued to decline since listing. The
forecast for both spring/summer and fall chinook in 1995 was even more bleak. See id. at 42,530.
77. See id. at 42,530. For a discussion of how small population size increases the risk of extinction,
see Michael E. Gilpin & Michael E. Soul6, Minimum Viable Populations:Processes of Species
Extinction, in ConservationBiology: The Science ofScarcity andDiversity 25-33 (Michael E. Soul6 ed.,
1986).
78. NMFS expressed optimism that changes in dam operations would yield long-term benefits to the
species. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 42,530. But see text accompanying supra note 5.
79. Harvest rates (commercial, recreational, and tribal combined) for Columbia and Snake River fall
chinook decreased from 70% in 1990 to 50% in 1991 to 1993, with no effect on the species' decline.
See 59 Fed. Reg. at 42,531.
80. See id. at 42,530-31.
8 1. See id. at 42,531.
82. See id.
83. See 59 Fed. Reg. 66,784 (1994).
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later, however, the agency withdrew the proposal due to significant
increased adult return counts and escapement estimates." Three months
after withdrawing its proposal, NMFS released a new, more comprehensive

proposal for fifteen West Coast chinook ESUs within California, Oregon,
Washington, and Idaho." The ESUs within the Columbia River Basin
included: (1)Lower Columbia River chinook; (2) Upper Columbia River
spring-ran chinook; (3) Upper Willamette River chinook; and (4) a
redefined Snake River fall-run chinook ESU.8 6 In March 1999, NMFS
decided to list these species.87
NMFS listed the Lower Columbia River chinook ESU as threatened.88
Habitat degradation in this ESU is widespread, primarily as a result of dam
construction dating back as far as the early 1900s.89 A long history of
hatchery fish releases also have had what NMFS termed a "pervasive

influence."9 Since 1930, fishery managers have released over 200 million
hatchery fish derived from stocks from outside the ESU, creating concern
over loss of genetic diversity and decreasing numbers in the wild
population. Indeed, with so many hatchery fish commingled with wild fish,
NMFS was unable to determine the number of wild fish in this ESU,91
although recent data from the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife
allowed NMFS to identify streams where wild runs continue to exist.92

84. See 63 Fed. Reg. 1807, 1809-10 (1998). Escapement of naturally spawning spring/summer
chinook rose from a low of 1116 in 1995 to an estimated 6500 in 1997, while fall chinook experienced
a more modest increase from 350 escaping individuals in 1995 to an estimated 726 in 1997. NMFS cited
improved management of the Snake and Columbia River dams for salmon migration, including
increased water flows and physical modifications to mainstem dams, as one cause of the increased
numbers. See id.
at 1810. Other potential factors NMFS discussed were curtailed harvest rates, increased
rainfall in the region, improved hatchery management, and strengthened regulatory mechanisms. See
id.
at 1811 tbl.l.
85. See 63 Fed. Reg. 11,482 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 226.28, 227.4(g), (p)-(q)
(1998)).
86. See id.NMFS redefined the Snake River fall chinook ESU that expanded the ESA's protections
to a broader geographic range of the species. See id.
at 11,497. The current Deschutes River population,
as well as the now-extirpated populations from the John Day, Umatilla, and Walla Walla Rivers was
included in the expanded ESU. Although the Snake River stocks were at one point the most productive
in the ESU, recent adult returns to the Deschutes River have surpassed those in the Snake. See id. at
11,497-98.
87. See 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.102(a)(16)-(18), 224.101(a)).
88. See id.
at 14,321.
89. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,495.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,321.
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NMFS listed the Upper Columbia River spring-run chinook ESU as
endangered. 93 Escapement in 1994-95 was the lowest in sixty years; at least
six stocks within the geographic range of this ESU are extinct.94 Dams have

probably played a larger role in contributing to the declines in this ESU than
in any other. Construction of the Grand Coulee and Chief Joseph Dams
forever blocked a "substantial portion" of salmon habitat.95 To reach the
remaining habitat, salmon must successfully navigate nine Columbia River
mainstem dams.96 According to NMFS, the combination of extensive
habitat loss, degraded riparian, in-stream, and estuary habitat, lost migration
corridors, and augmented flow patterns put this ESU in danger of
extinction.97 Artificial propagation through hatchery and trap-and-transport
programs has also had a significant effect. Attempts to restock Columbia
River tributaries by trapping adults at dams and transporting them to
streams with depressed populations likely has led to the introduction of nonnative fish, and the consequent dilution of the native genetic stock. 98 A
recent study conducted by an interagency working group developing a
habitat conservation plan on the Mid-Columbia River determined that there
is a greater than fifty-percent chance the species will go extinct within fifty
years under current conditions." 9
NMFS listed the Upper Willamette River chinook ESU as threatened.30
Wild fish account for only one-third of escapement counts in this ESU; they
are likely declining and unable to sustain themselves.' Hatchery influences
are less pervasive here than in the lower Columbia, but nevertheless may
have caused homogenization of the populations.'0 2 Another genetic
detriment is the possible hybridization between wild spring chinook and
hatchery fall chinook. As with other Columbia River Basin chinook ESUs,
dam construction and agricultural uses are responsible for blocking and

93. See id. at 14,324.
94. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,497.
95. Id.
96. See id.
Construction of Grand Coulee Dam in 1939 forever blocked all anadromous fish from over
1100 miles of upstream habitat. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
97. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,497.
98 See id.
99. See 64 Fed. Reg. 14,308, 14,323 (1999).
100. See id.
101. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,495. Wild fish escapement is below 5000 fish and declining. See id. at
11,496.
102. See id. at 11,495-96.
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degrading habitat.

3

Unlike some of the more rural ESUs, however,

urbanization played a significant role here.')' Moreover, commercial and
recreational fishery harvests are too high for an already-declining wild
105

population.

All chinook ESUs suffer in various ways from inadequate regulatory
mechanisms. The Northwest Forest Plan, the centerpiece of which is an

aquatic conservation strategy, is limited because it applies only to federal
lands, which are only sporadically distributed throughout the ESUs'
range.

6

PACFISH-an agreement between the U.S. Forest Service and

Bureau of Land Management providing interim anadromous fish
management strategies within the Columbia Basin-is similarly limited.0 7
Federal lands covered by the agreement are inadequate to protect salmon.'
State regulatory protections similarly are inadequate. For example, NMFS
considers both the Oregon and Washington forest practices regulations
insufficient salmon protectors because, among other things, they do not

adequately provide for the introduction of woody debris into streams to
create salmon habitat."°
Statutory mechanisms have failed to improve the status of chinook
ESUs. The protections offered salmonids under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) are inadequate as currently implemented."' For example, the
guidelines governing authorized discharges of dredged or fill material under
section 404 of the CWA lack a methodology for assessing cumulative
103. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,322.
104. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,496.
105. See id.
106. See Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Serv., FinalSupplementalEnvironmentalImpact
Statement on Management ofHabitatfor Late Successional and Old Growth ForestRelated Species
Within the Range ofthe NorthernSpotted Owl (1994) [hereinafter Northwest ForestPlan].
107. See id.; Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part ofEcosystems?, 28 Envtl. L. 1, 10-11 (1998)
(discussing some key features of PACFISH).
108. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,499. According to NMFS, other programs within the chinook ESUs are
the Lower Columbia River National Estuary Program, the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds, the
Washington Wild Stock Restoration Initiative, and the Washington Wild Salmonid Policy. See 64 Fed.
Reg. at 14,316.
109. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,500 (noting that introduction of organic material is important for creating
fish). NMFS did recognize, however, a recent effort by Oregon's Governor Kitzhaber to advance longterm protective measures for salmonids in an Executive Order implementing aspects of the Oregon Plan
for Salmon and Watersheds. Moreover, NMFS noted efforts to improve water quality in the Willamette
River by the Cities of Portland, Oregon and Vancouver, Washington, as well as the Oregon regional
government, Metro. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,317.
110. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); see also 63
Fed. Reg. at 11,500.
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impacts of such discharges, which can destroy salmon spawning and rearing
habitat."' Failure to meet the CWA's water quality standards can also leave
2
salmon habitat polluted, especially from warm temperatures." 1
3.

West CoastSteelhead

In August 1997, NMFS listed five of fifteen steelhead ESUs: three as
threatened and two as endangered." 3 In March 1998, NMFS listed two
steelhead ESUs as threatened: one in California and one in the Columbia
Basin."4 A year later NMFS listed two more ESUs as threatened." 5
Steelhead have the most complex salmonid life histories, with both
anadromous forms (steelhead) and freshwater forms (rainbow or redband
trout)." 6 West Coast steelhead are further divided into coastal and inland
subspecies, roughly separated by the crest of the Cascades.' 17 Historically,
the species ranged from the Asian Kamchatka Peninsula to the northern
Baja Peninsula, with forms appearing in nearly every coastal stream in
between. The current range along the U.S. West Coast has diminished,
however, so that the known southernmost extent of the range is Malibu
Creek in Southern California. 18 Throughout the remaining range, at least
twenty-three natural stocks are extinct, and another forty-three face some
risk of extinction." 9 For the purpose of listing the species under the ESA,
NMFS identified fifteen ESUs within the remaining West Coast
populations.
I 11.

See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,500.
112. The effects ofnonpoint source pollution on fishery resources are frequently ignored. See id. One
way to address this problem is by setting Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for waters not meeting
state water quality standards. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (authorizing TMDL program). After determining
the total amount of pollution a water body can absorb and meet state water quality standards, the state
allocates that amount of pollution among permittees. For an extensive exposition on the TMDL process,
see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrectionof Water QualityStandards-BasedRegulation Under
the Clean Water Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,329 (July 1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs,
Are We There Yet? The Long Road Toward Water Quality-BasedRegulation Under the Clean Water
Act, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,391 (August 1997); Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs 111. A New
Frameworkforthe Clean WaterAct's Ambient StandardsProgram,28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,415 (Aug. 1998).
113. See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.23(a), 227.4(j)-(1) (1998)).
114. See 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227.4(m) (1998)).
115. See 64 Fed. Reg. 14,517 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(14)-(15)).
116. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,938.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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Responding to petitions to list steelhead throughout its range,' 20 NMFS
initially proposed to list ten of the fifteen ESUs: five as threatened and five
as endangered.' 2 ' But in the 1997 listings NMFS decided to list only two
ESUs as endangered and three as threatened." Those listings were followed
by four more listings for a total of nine listed ESUs as of March 1999.'2
Within the Columbia River Basin, NMFS listed the Upper Columbia River
ESU as endangered and the Snake River Basin ESU as threatened;'2 4 the
Lower Columbia ESU as threatened;" 2 and the Middle Columbia and Upper
126
Willamette River ESUs as threatened.
The Upper Columbia River steelhead ESU extends from the Yakima
River in Washington to the United States-Canada border.'2 7 However, most
of the habitat in the ESU has been unavailable because construction of
Grand Coulee Dam blocked over 1100 miles of upstream salmon habitat in
1939.128 Steelhead in this ESU, already depressed from overfishing,129 were
confined to substantially less of their native habitat by Grand Coulee Dam,
making valuable spawning grounds unavailable to migrating salmon. In an
attempt to alleviate the adverse effects of this habitat loss, from 1939 to
1943 the fishery agencies trapped all anadromous fish at Rock Island Dam,
below Grand Coulee, then transplanted them to hatcheries or released them
in tributaries between the two dams.' 30 In the process, they redistributed
steelhead without regard to their stream of origin, which indiscriminately
mixed genetic stocks in the hatcheries.' 31 Since construction of Grand
Coulee, naturally spawning steelhead have continued to decline, both in
absolute numbers and in relation to the number of hatchery fish in the
ESU.132 Even more telling is that the remaining wild fish are not producing
120. See 61 Fed. Reg. 41,541, 41,541-42 (summarizing various petitions to list steelhead).
121. See 61 Fed. Reg. 41,541 (1996) (codified at50 C.F.R §§ 222.23(a),227.4(n)-(q), 227.21(a)-

(b)(1998)).
122.
123.
14,517
124.
125.

See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,937.
See 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R § 227.4(m)-(n) (1998)); 64 Fed. Reg.
(1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102(a)(14)-(15)).
See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,937.
See 63 Fed. Reg. at 13,347.

126. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 14,517.
127. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,945.
128. See id. at 43,945-46.
129. See id.at 43,949.

130. See id.at43,946.
131. See id.at 43,946, 43,949-50.
132. See id. at 43,949 (noting that hatchery fish account for 65-80% of steelhead in these rivers).
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enough surviving offspring to replace themselves. NMFS estimated that the
adult replacement ratio was only 0.3:1 in the Wenatchee and Entiat
Rivers, 33 meaning that only thirty percent of the adult wild population are
replaced each year, a sure recipe for extinction.
The Snake River Basin steelhead ESU includes southeast Washington,
northeast Oregon, and Idaho. 3 4 Based on life history differences in run
timing, size, and habitat use, Snake River steelhead are divided into A-run
and B-run components. This is a management distinction only, however,
and does not require separate treatment under the ESA. There are no counts
of naturally spawning steelhead prior to construction of Ice Harbor Dam in
1962. Total counts at Lower Granite Dam from 1990-1994 averaged
71,000 adult salmon, of which approximately 9400 were wild fish (7000 Arun and 2400 B-run). 35 According to NMFS, these runs "have suffered
severe declines," especially the B-run steelhead. 136 Hatchery fish account for
over eighty percent of the fish counted at Lower Granite Dam, and in some
reaches of the basin there is a pronounced risk of hatchery fish mixing with
wild stocks. Increasingly, small population sizes leave this ESU susceptible
to random genetic and demographic events that may lead to extinction.'37
Not surprisingly, NMFS listed hydropower development as a key factor
leading to the decline of West Coast steelhead.' 38 Other factors included
increased in-stream and oceanic predation, increased susceptibility to
disease, climatic and drought-related influences, and the addition of
hatchery fish.'39 In Washington and Oregon, land use practices on federal
and private lands dramatically decreased the number of large deep pools
important to the species, through siltation and removal of pool-forming
objects like boulders and downed trees."4° In this area, listed steelhead are
also subject to a large incidental harvest, possibly exceeding thirty percent,
because the timing of these runs coincides with runs of other nonlisted,
commercially harvested, hatchery-produced steelhead, chinook, and coho. 4 '

133. See id.
134. See id. at 43,946.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 43,950.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 43,942.
See id.
See id.

141. See id.
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NMFS recognized the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms to
protect steelhead. First, as with chinook, NMFS concluded that both federal
and state forest practices are inadequate to protect steelhead. 42 For example,
the Northwest Forest Plan is of limited utility in protecting steelhead
because much of the species' range is composed of nonfederal lands. Where
the plan does overlap with steelhead habitat, most notably in the Columbia
River Basin, the distribution of federal lands does not always correspond
with watersheds and river basins in need of protection. 43 PACFISH-an
interim agreement between the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management creating anadromous fish management strategies-is similarly
limited to federal lands, and the federal agencies charged with its operation
have not consistently implemented its watershed and riparian habitat
measures.1" Nor do state forest practices regulations provide sufficient
protections because, as in the case of Washington's rules, they "do not
provide properly functioning riparian and instream habitats.' ' 45
Second, as with chinook, NMFS claimed that protections for salmon
afforded by the CWA, and its implementation by the Corps and states, are
currently inadequate. According to NMFS, the Corps has failed to
adequately consider cumulative and additive impacts from dredge and fill
operations, and EPA and the state were slow to implement the CWA's
water quality programs. ' Finally, state hatchery and harvest programs have
had significant adverse effects on wild steelhead populations in the
Columbia and Snake River Basins. 47 Although Oregon, Washington, and
Idaho are implementing new regulatory policies to protect wild steelhead
from the detrimental effects of hatcheries and harvest, NMFS4 concluded
that additional measures were required to prevent extinction. 1

142. See id.at 43,942-43.
143. The U.S. Forest Service manages only 15-25% of the land in each of the steelhead ESUs. See id.
144. See id.
(describing inadequacies ofplans in context ofsteelhead).
145. Id. at 43,943.
146. See id.(describing relevant CWA programs).
147. See id.
at 43,944.
148. See id.An example is Oregon's Wild Fish Management Policy. See Or. Admin. 1. 635-0070525 to -0535 (1998).
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Chum

In March 1999, NMFS listed two ESUs of chum salmon as threatened,
one of which inhabits the Columbia Basin. 149 Chum ranges more widely
than any other Pacific salmon, historically reaching from Monterey Bay in
central California to Korea and Japan, and north into the Russian and
Canadian rivers that empty into the Arctic Ocean. 5 Today, the species'
range has contracted so that in the United States it ranges only as far south
as Tillamook Bay in Oregon. 5' Chum also were once the most abundant
salmonid known, likely accounting for about fifty percent of the total
salmon biomass in the Pacific Ocean prior to 1940.152An important feature
of the species' life history is that it spends relatively little time in freshwater
habitat compared to other salmon; adults spawn in coastal streams within
100 kilometers of the coasts and juveniles migrate to the ocean "almost
immediately after emerging" from the spawning grounds.' This means the
species is less susceptible to many of the deleterious effects of inland
human activities that have caused widespread decline
of other salmon
54
species like steelhead, coho, chinook, and sockeye.
Columbia River chum currently amount to less than one percent of their
historic abundance.'55 Prior to a dramatic crash of the ESU's population in
the 1950s, chum were extensively harvested, accounting for as many as half
a million fish caught in the Columbia River alone. 6 Since then there has
been no commercial chum fishery, and the population has remained
relatively stable, albeit severely depressed in numbers and genetic
diversity.'57
Despite the species' coastal life history characteristics and relative
independence of freshwater stream systems, NMFS considered habitat
149. The second listed ESU is the Hood Canal summer-run ESU, which occurs in Washington State
outside the Columbia Basin. See 64 Fed. Reg. 14,508 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
§ 223.102(a)(12)-(13)). NMFS also recognizes two other chum ESUs that it did not list: Puget
Sound/Strait of Georgia ESU and Pacific Coast ESU. See 63 Fed. Reg. 11,774 (1998) (codified at 50
C.F.R. §§ 226.26, 227.4(m)-(n) (1998)).
150. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 11,775.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 11,780.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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destruction and modification of these systems to be a major cause of the

species' decline; use of streams for log transportation and removing large
woody debris from streams has a negative effect on the species. 5 Other

habitat-related effects on chum come from water withdrawals and other
water uses that decrease stream flows; logging and agriculture which
increase stream sedimentation and loss of riparian habitat; mining; and

urbanization. 59 Hydropower development played less of a role in this
species' decline than that of other salmon, but nonetheless has blocked
habitat areas and currently impedes upriver recovery efforts."
B.

Bull Trout

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has listed or proposed for listing all
five of the bull trout distinct population segments. 6 ' A number of factors
affect the populations in various ways. Dams are particularly lethal for
Columbia River bull trout because they destroy habitat, alter temperature
and flow regimes, and most importantly, cut off the migratory form of bull

trout from interbreeding with other populations and recolonizing extirpated
populations.162 This, in turn, reduces genetic diversity within the species. 63

Forest management practices are another concern for bull trout. Logging
and road building diminish the value of stream habitats for all bull trout life-

history stages by modifying rates of sedimentation and woody debris
recruitment, increasing water temperatures, and altering water flows."6
Similarly, livestock grazing, agricultural practices, and mining activities all

158. Seei. at 11,782.
159. Seeia at 11,783.
160. See U
161. NMFS originally proposed to list the Klamath River population as endangered but eventually
decided to list Klamath bull trout as threatened, although it did list as endangered the Jarbidge
population on an emergency interim basis in 1998, and later designated it as threatened in 1999. See 62
Fed. Reg. 32,268 (1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h), 17.44(v) (1998)); 63 Fed. Reg. 31,647
(1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R1 §§ 17.11(h), 17.44(v) (1998)); 63 Fed. Reg. 31,693 (1998) (codified at 50
C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h), 17.44(v) (1998)); 63 Fed. Reg. 42,757 (1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)
(1998)); 64 Fed. Reg. 17,110 (1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11(h), 17.44(x)).
162. Bull trout exist as metapopulations, with the migratory form of bull the primary means by which
genes flow between populations and new or extirpated areas are colonized. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,649,
31,657.
163. See id. at 31,657. Dams have so fragmented bull trout habitat that, within the Columbia River
population segment, fully two-thirds of the subpopulations are directly or indirectly isolated from each
other. See id.
164. See id. at 31,658.
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adversely affect riparian areas and habitat and water quality. 65 Other factors
injuring the species include residential construction, historic overharvesting,
introduction of non-native species, extensive habitat fragmentation, and
isolation. In addition, inadequate regulatory protections, particularly a lack
of watershed management on federal lands managed by the Forest Service
and Bureau of Land Management, negatively affect the species. 66
Although citizen petitions activated the listing process for sockeye,
chinook, and steelhead, a citizen suit was necessary to bring about the
listing of bull trout. In October 1992, environmental groups petitioned the
U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list bull trout as an endangered
species.' 67 In May 1993, over six months after the petition to list, FWS
issued a finding indicating that there was substantial evidence that listing
bull trout might be warranted.16 When FWS failed to decide whether to list
bull trout within the statutorily required twelve months, environmentalists
sued to compel FWS to make a decision, 69 which it eventually did.
However, FWS determined that although a listing was warranted, it was
precluded because other species required attention from the agency's
limited resources. 7 This determination was based on FWS's speciesranking system,' 7' in which only species ranked between one and six (out
of a possible twelve) received listing attention. Because of the way FWS
structures the ranking system, only species with a "high" magnitude of
threat receive listing attention. Although FWS recognized an imminent
threat to bull trout, it characterized the threat as only "moderate."' 72 The
agency therefore awarded bull trout a rank of nine.'73
The 1994 "warranted but precluded" finding quickly came under attack
from the original petitioners, who filed suit. FWS subsequently upgraded
bull trout's rank from nine to three in a 1995 finding, 74 allowing the agency
165. See id. at 31,660-62.
166. See id.
at 31,662-7 1.
167. See 58 Fed. Reg. 28,849 (1993).
168. See id.
169. See Friends of the Wild Swan v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 945 F. Supp. 1388, 1392
(D. Or. 1996) (citing Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Babbitt, No. 94-0246-JLG (D.D.C. 1994)).
170. See 59 Fed. Reg. 30,254, 30,254 (1994).
171. The ranking system places species warranted for listing on a scale of I to 12, depending on
(1) the magnitude of threat facing the species, (2) the immediacy of the threat, and (3) the species'
taxonomic rank. See 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,102-03 (1983).
172. Friendsofthe Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1392.
173. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 30,254.
174. See 60 Fed. Reg. 30,825, 30,825 (1995).
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to move to dismiss the petitioners' suit as moot because the 1995 finding

supplanted the contested 1994 finding. The district court agreed that the
1995 finding mooted the suit, but allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to challenge the new finding. 75 The plaintiffs declined the court's
invitation, however, and instead appealed the mootness decision. The Ninth

Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, determining that the case fell within "the
exception to the mootness doctrine for claims that are capable of repetition
yet evading review," and consequently remanded the case to the district
court.'76

On remand, the district court concluded that FWS's 1994 "warranted but
precluded" finding was arbitrary and capricious.'77 The court ruled that FWS

had failed to address the petitioners' requests for emergency listings of
numerous bull trout populations. 7 ' Moreover, the court concluded that FWS

acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it determined that the threat to bull
trout was only "moderate."' 79 Ultimately, the court ordered FWS to
reconsider the 1994 "warranted but precluded" finding, based solely on the

1994 administrative record.'

175. See Friends ofthe Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1393.
176. Friends of the Wild Swan v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 95-35916, 1996 WL
155142, at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 1996).
177. See Friendsofthe Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1393.
178. FWS argued that because it determined a listing was "warranted but precluded" in 1994, it had
responded to petitioners' emergency listing requests. The court disagreed, noting that when making a
"warranted but precluded" finding, the ESA requires FWS to use its emergency listing powers in a
prophylactic manner. See id. at 1395 ("Congress's 1998 amendment [to the ESA] was 'unambiguous
congressional direction to the Secretary that emergency listings of warranted but precluded species be
issued prophylactically"' (quoting City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
The court noted that FWS had mentioned the requests for emergency listing in its finding, but the agency
did so in a cursory manner for only a portion of the populations requested. Because FWS could not
explain why it denied the requests for emergency listing, the court concluded that the decision not to list
bull trout on an emergency basis was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 1396.
179. FWS's rationale for the "moderate" threat conclusion was grounded on the species' extensive
range, the existence of some populations in protected areas, and future management changes expected
to benefit the species. See id. at 1397. However, the record supported none of these claims. First, there
was no indication in the record that the species' extensive range or its existence in protected areas
lessened the threat of extinction. Indeed, FWS repeatedly referred to the genetic isolation of bull trout
populations, due to loss of its migratory form, as creating a high risk of extinction. Second, the record
reflected that, even in protected wilderness areas and national parks, bull trout face the risk of extinction
from other introduced species. Third, as the court noted, reliance on predicted future management
actions was contrary to FWS's duty to consider existing threats, see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1994), and at
odds with its determination that listing was warranted because of inadequate existing regulatory
mechanisms. See Friendsofthe WildSwan, 945 F. Supp. at 1397-98.
180. See Friends ofthe Wild Swan, 945 F. Supp. at 1401-02.
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The district court's decision did not end the bull trout dispute, however.
FWS's revised finding recognized five distinct population segments 8 ' of
bull trout but proposed to list only two of them.'82 This sent the parties back
to court to challenge FWS's decision not to list bull trout throughout its
range.'83 Again, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs, requiring FWS
to reconsider its decision. The court ruled that FWS's decision to dissect the
species into five distinct populations without considering listing the species
throughout its range was arbitrary and capricious.'84 Consequently, the court
remanded the decision again, instructing FWS to consider listing the species
as a whole.'85 As a result, all five population segments are now listed or
proposed for listing.'86
C.

Oregon Coho

Like bull trout, Oregon coho were the subject of a citizen petition, this
one filed in July 1993.187 A subsequent petition, filed in October 1993,
requested listings for all coho on the contiguous West Coast.'8 8 In July
181. FWS's "distinct population segment" policy differs from NMFS's ESU policy, although both
are intended to implement the definition of "species" under the ESA. Most notably, FWS's policy
accounts for a population's geographical distribution and political boundaries, in addition to genetic
considerations. See 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4725 (1996).
182. The five distinct population segments were Coastal/Puget Sound, Klamath River, Columbia
River, Jarbidge River, and Saskatchewan River. The Klamath River population was proposed as
endangered, while the Columbia River population was proposed as threatened. See Friends of the Wild
Swan v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1122-23 (D. Or. 1998).
183. See id. at 1123.
184. See id. at 1124. Key to the court's ruling was that FWS had "discussed the five ESA factors for
the bull trout species throughout its range but made listing decisions only for the five population
segments." Id. at 1130. Also important was that the court's earlier ruling to reconsider the 1994 finding,
on which the new finding was based, limited the agency to making a decision based solely on the 1994
record. Because FWS's distinct population segment policy did not go into effect until 1996, the court
said the agency could not rely on it in reconsidering the 1994 decision. See id. at 1133. Moreover, by
considering only five population segments, FWS ignored the thrust of the original petition to list bull
trout throughout the coterminous United States. See id. at 1134.
185. Despite the remand, however, the court's order did not interfere with the FWS proposal to list
the Klamath and Columbia River distinct population segments. See id.at 1136 (noting that "none of this
evaluation process is to in any way affect the ongoing listing of the Klamath River and Columbia River
population segments").
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
187. See 58 Fed. Reg. 57,770 (1993); 60 Fed. Reg. 38,011 (1995). Earlier, NMFS denied listing for
Columbia River coho on the ground that the remaining remnant wild populations did not constitute an
"evolutionarily significant unit" of the species. See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,553, 29,553 (1991); see also Rohlf,
supranote 42, at 636-51 (criticizing NMFS's ESU approach to defining "species" for ESA purposes).
188. See 58 Fed. Reg. 3662 (1993); 60 Fed. Reg. at 38,011.
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1995, NMFS responded by proposing three coho species for listing,
including Oregon coho. 8 9 Although Oregon coho numbered around 1.4
million adults at the turn of the century and supported a productive ocean
fishery into the 1970s, their numbers collapsed after 1978 and have
remained low ever since. 9 ' NMFS attributed the decline to a variety of
factors, including logging, agricultural practices, urbanization, stream
channelization, dams, wetland loss, water withdrawals, unscreened
irrigation diversions, and mining practices."' Also posing problems were
hatchery practices, poor ocean conditions, and harvest management
practices. 92
The combination of a congressional moratorium on new ESA listings and
a six-month extension that NMFS invoked under the ESA delayed a final
decision on Oregon coho until April 1997.1'9 This delay gave Oregon time
to develop a program designed to convince NMFS that the existence of the
state program obviated the need for a listing. In October 1995, three months
after NMFS proposed listing Oregon coho, Oregon governor John
Kitzhaber announced a planning effort aimed at warding off a listing. 4 In
August 1996, during the congressional moratorium on new listings, the state
released a draft program, called the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration
Initiative. In March 1997, only a month before NMFS's statutory deadline
for determining whether to list Oregon coho, the state submitted a revised
program' Of the plan's three goals-avoiding a listing, restoring coho
populations, and using exclusively existing laws and regulations' 6-only
the second had anything to do with the health of the salmon. The Oregon
189. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 38,016. NMFS also proposed to list southern Oregon/northern California

coast coho and central California coast coho. See id
190.' See id at 38,021.

191. See id. at 38,024.
192. See id. NMFS observed that in recent years harvests had been eliminated or severely

circumscribed, but populations continued to decline. See id. at 38,025.
193. Under the ESA, final listing determinations must normally be made within one year of proposals.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A) (1994). However, a six-month extension is available under 16 U.S.C. §
1536(b)(6)(B) (1994). In April 1995, Congress imposed a moratorium on new listings until the end of
September 1996. See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-159 to
1321-160 (1996). When the moratorium ended, NMFS invoked the statutory six-month extension, citing
substantial disagreement concerning the sufficiency and adequacy of the agency's data. See 61 Fed. Reg.
56,211, 56,211 (1996).
194. See State of Oregon, 1997 Oregon CoastalSalmon Restoration Initiativeat 2-4 (last modified
Mar. 22, 1997) <http://www.oregon-plan.org/Final.html>.

195. See id.
196. See id at 2-1, 2-3, 7-2.
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plan sought to achieve salmon restoration through agency coordination,
private volunteer action, increased enforcement of existing state laws, and
public education. 97
NMFS was unconvinced that the speculative and voluntary nature of the
state program would support a decision not to list Oregon coho.
Accordingly, it persuaded the state to enter into a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) to provide additional habitat protection measures,
including unspecified improvements in forest and agricultural practices,
streamflows, and gravel removal regulation. 9 In the MOA the state also
committed to implement all measures contained in both the MOA and the
state plan;' NMFS promised technical support and staff assistance to aid
in implementation.2" However, by its terms, either the state or NMFS could
terminate the MOA with thirty days' notice.2"'
On May 6, 1997, NMFS decided not to list Oregon coho. It based this
decision largely on the measures contained in the Oregon plan and the
accompanying MOA, although NMFS also mentioned the habitat
protections in the federal Northwest Forest Plan and pointed to improved
numbers of spawning coho.20 z NMFS did suggest that if the state did not
undertake improved habitat protection measures within two years, the
agency would reconsider its decision not to list.20 3
NMFS's decision not to list Oregon coho was immediately challenged
by a number of environmental groups, led by the Oregon Natural Resources
Council. On June 1, 1998, U.S. Magistrate Janice Stewart agreed with the
environmentalists that NMFS had impermissibly failed to list Oregon
coho. 2 4According to the court, NMFS's finding that Oregon coho was not
likely to become an endangered species within the two-year interval
between the listing decision and the state's adoption of improved habitat
measures was inconsistent with the ESA, which defines a threatened species
as any species which is "likely to become an endangered species within the
197. See id.
at 10.
198. See State of Oregon & National Marine Fisheries Serv., Memorandwn ofAgreement § 7 (April
1997). For example, the MOA authorized NMFS to propose changes in forest practices to the state
Board of Forestry or the Oregon Legislature at any time. See id. § 7.f.
199. See id §4.a.
200. See id. § 4.b.
201. See id. § 12.
202. See 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588,24,588 (1997). NFS did list the southern Oregon/northern California
coho as threatened. See id
203. See id at 24,607-08.
204. See Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Or. 1998).
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foreseeable future."2 5 The court noted that if NMFS could not determine
that Oregon coho were not likely to become endangered within the
foreseeable future, the species was already in fact a threatened species." 6
Judge Stewart also faulted NMFS for relying on state promises of future
regulatory measures, when the ESA clearly limited NMFS's consideration
to "existing regulatory mechanisms" in deciding not to list a species.2
Reliance on voluntary measures was also impermissible, according to the
court, because they are too speculative; the ESA requires NMFS to rely on
current, enforceable measures in making listing determinations.2 "° Although
the court determined that NMFS could rely on implementation of measures
in the Northwest Forest Plan as an "existing regulatory measure" that could
possibly obviate the need for a listing, the federal plan governed only thirtyfive percent of the area in the range of the Oregon coho. Moreover, NMFS
had earlier concluded that the habitat protection provided by the federal
plan was insufficient, absent adequate protection on nonfederal lands.2"
This judicial refusal to allow NMFS to deny listing of a species based on
a state program consisting of a patchwork of existing authorities is no doubt
a therapeutic development.2" Not only was the Oregon plan based largely
on speculation and unenforceable promises, it is unlikely that Congress, in
enacting the ESA, intended to allow a state program to function in lieu of
a federal listing. Statutes that do envision such a prominent role for state
regulation, like the Clean Water Act, contain detailed procedures for

205. Id.at 1150-51 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)).
206. See id at 1152.
207. Id at 1153-54 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D)). The court also noted that the ESA's
authorization to consider "efforts, if any, being made by any State" in making listing decisions under

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) referred only to existing efforts. Id.
208. See id. at 1155.
209. See id at 1157. The court also discounted NMFS's reliance on harvest cutbacks and improved
hatchery measures because (1) the harvest measures in the Oregon plan were only a four-year interim
proposal, with no assurance of continuation beyond 2000; and (2) the promised hatchery improvements
were contradicted by a NMFS finding that their "full and prompt implementation.., has not occurred."
Id at 1159-60 (citing 62 Fed. Reg. at 24,598 exhibit 1).
210. The state filed an appeal of the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but subsequently withdrew the
appeal. See Jonathan Brinkman, OregonAbandons Fightwith U.S. over CoastalCoho, Oregonian, Jan.
23, 1999, at DI; Salmon Fight Shifts to East Coast: Lawsuit Filedon Maine as Oregon, Feds Drop
Appeal, Endangered Species & Wetlands Rep., Feb. 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Salmon FightShifts].
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approving and overseeing the operation of state programs.2 1' The ESA

contains no similar provisions.212
III. THE BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS
The role of federal agencies under the ESA does not end when a species
is listed. The species continues to benefit from the Act's protective
provisions, including bans on sales, imports, exports, and "takes" of
endangered species.213 In addition, federal agencies may not jeopardize the
21 4
continued existence of species or adversely modify their critical habitat.
In order to fulfill this substantive duty, the ESA prescribes a consultation
procedure under which the listing agency, NMFS or FWS, may issue a
biological opinion (BiOp) on the proposed federal action.2 5' The effect of
this consultation process is to remove decisionmaking authority from action
agencies, which propose actions that may adversely affect listed species,
and give it to the consulting agencies, NMFS and FWS. 1 6 Moreover, the
211. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(h) (1994) (state National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
programs); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (g)-(h) (1994) (state dredge and fill programs).
212. This is not to suggest, however, that state programs like the Oregon plan have no role to play
in ESA implementation, only that their existence should not be a justification for denying a listing. The
Oregon plan may have an important influence in formulating habitat conservation plans necessary for
section 10 incidental take permits, for example. The Oregon plan may also prove to be a model for a
state species protection program. On January 8, 1999, Governor Kitzhaber signed Executive Order 9901, which expanded the state's salmon program beyond Oregon coho to include all native wild
salmonids in all areas of the state. The executive order (1) called upon state agencies and local watershed
councils to set biological and habitat goals to protect and restore salmonids on a regional basis; (2)
required all state agencies to ensure that their actions "to the maximum extent practicable minimize and
mitigate adverse effcts ... on salmonids or the habitat they depend on" and to "not appreciably reduce
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of salmonids in the wild"; and (3) established a restoration
goal of sustainable population levels within the foreseeable future which provide substantial
environmental, cultural, and economic benefits to Oregonians in the long term. Oregon Executive Order
No. 99-01, § (1)(c)-(e) (1999).
213. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1994) (imports and exports (A); takes (B); and sales (D)).
Prohibitions on "taking" of threatened species may be applied by regulation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)
(1994). The ESA defines "taking" to include "harm." See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The ESA regulations
define harm to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). The regulations were upheld by the Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home
ChapterofCommunitiesfor a GreatOregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
214. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
215. Only formal consultation results in a biological opinion. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (1994). For
a detailed discussion of formal and informal consultation procedures, see Kilboume, supra note 16, at
525-72.
216. The conclusions in the BiOp technically are not binding on the action agency. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b)(3)(A) (describing process by which Secretary produces biological opinion and "suggests" to
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statute restricts the discretion of the consulting agencies by requiring NMFS
and FWS to employ "best available" science, specify the expected effects
of proposals on species and their habitat, and suggest alternatives designed
to avoid jeopardizing or adversely modifying designated critical habitat.217
The BiOp is thus the means by which the ESA's principal substantive
directives-to avoid species jeopardy or adverse modification to critical
habitat-are carried out.218
While the ESA's scope is extensive, its protections remain limited in
several ways. In the case of listed Pacific salmon, our study of BiOps and
associated litigation underscores the ESA's remarkable scope, which allows
scrutiny of hydroelectric operations, hatchery practices, harvest management, and habitat management. At the same time, the limitations of the
ESA's consultation requirements are apparent because they apply only to
federal activities and private actions subject to federal control.2 19 In

addition, contrary to some claims, 20 the effect of ESA consultation is hardly
draconian, and in fact is quite sensitive to economic considerations.
agency reasonable and prudent alternatives that Secretary believes will allow action to go forward
without violating section 7); see also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-04 (Sth Cir. 1976);
accordTribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988); Roosevelt Campobello
Int'l Park Comm'n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1049 (Ist Cir. 1982). However, the Supreme Court has made
clear that BiOps are virtually binding, exerting "a powerful coercive effect on the action agency," and
may be judicially challenged independently of the subsequent action because they have "direct and
appreciable legal consequences." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169, 178 (1997).
217. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(3)(A).
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); see also North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 607 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). A BiOp estimates the effects a proposed federal action will have on listed species and
essentially attempts to predict the future state of the species after the proposed action takes place. If the
agency performing the BiOp concludes that the post-action state of the species will not jeopardize its
continued existence or adversely affect critical habitat, the agency issues a "no jeopardy" BiOp. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If the consulting agency concludes that the post-action state of the species will
jeopardize the species' existence, it issues a "jeopardy" BiOp, which must contain "reasonable and
prudent alternatives," if they exist, that would allow the proposed action to proceed without jeopardizing
the species' existence. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3), (g)(5) (1998).
219. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(B); see also John M. Volkman, The EndangeredSpecies Act and
the Ecosystem ofColumbia River Salmon, 4 Hastings West-Northwest J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 51, 61-64
(1997) (surveying other limitations of ESA in context of Columbia River salmon restoration, including
(1) its focus on individual species, not ecosystems; (2) its inability to undo damaging developments that
have previously occurred; (3) its emphasis on avoiding jeopardy, rather than ensuring recovery; (4) its
relatively closed process of federal consultation, in which interested parties are unable to participate or
even observe; and (5) the perception that ESA is uncompromising and fuels political opposition).
220. Detractors of the ESA continue to characterize it as inflexible and draconian. See, e-g., Jonathan
Brinkman, Kitzhaber ChampionsResource Cooperation,Oregonian, Dec. 5, 1998, at Al (explaining
the motivation behind Oregon's Salmon Plan as being to avoid effects of "harsh" and "inflexible"
environmental laws like ESA); H. Josef Hebert, On 20th Anniversary, EndangeredSpeciesAct Elicits
Admiration, Ire, L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1999, at B4 (discussing continuing conflict over ESA); Rob

Washington Law Review
A.

Vol. 74:519, 1999

HydropowerBiOps

NMFS issued the first BiOp on Columbia Basin salmon in April 1992,
shortly after listing Snake River sockeye and chinook.22' The agency
determined that 1992 Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations would not
jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon because changes in
the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program approved by the Northwest
Power Planning Council promised to improve survival rates over the
previous year's.' Although this standard for jeopardy was controversial,
because improvements over the previous year would not necessarily
counteract the decline of the listed species, 2" the 1992 BiOp was not
challenged in court.
1.

Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries
Service: Callingfor a "Complete Overhaul" in Hydropower
Operations

NMFS's jeopardy standard was not to go unchallenged for long. In 1993,
NMFS refined the standard to embrace a two-step analysis, requiring
(1) improved survival over a "base period" of 1986-90, and (2) operations

that, in combination with all other human effects on salmon, were
reasonably likely to reduce mortalities so that, in the long-term, salmon
populations would stabilize. 4 Determining that 1993 hydroelectric

Taylor, Bulkheads Found to Destroy Some Vital MarineHabitat: A Salmon Fighton the Beach, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Mar. 18, 1999, at Al (expressing concern over "draconian" regulations that will result
from listing Puget Sound chinook salmon).
221. See supranotes 63, 72, and accompanying text. The discussion of the 1992 and 1993 BiOps and
the ensuing litigation is adapted from Michael C. Blumm et al., Beyond the ParityPromise:Struggling
to Save ColumbiaBasin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 Envtl. L. 21, 42-44 (1997) [hereinafter Blumm
et al., Beyond Parity].
222. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., EndangeredSpecies Act Section 7 Consultation/Conference
BiologicalOpinion: 1992 Operationof the FederalColumbia River Power System (1992) [hereinafter
1992 BiOp]. On the 1991 amendments to the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, see Michael
C. Blumm, Saving Idaho'sSalmon: A History ofFailureanda Dubious Future,28 Idaho L. Rev. 667,
690-96 (1992) [hereinafter Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon].
223. See Steven Daugherty, Threatened Owls and Endangered Salmon: Implementing the
ConsultationRequirements ofthe EndangeredSpecies Act, 14 Pub. Land L. Rev. 203,242-43 (1993).
In the 1992 BiOp, NMFS issued an incidental take statement, allowing takes of the listed salmon so long
as the dam operators modified operations to minimize takes. See 1992 BiOp, supranote 222, at 63-72.
On incidental take statements, see Kilboume, supranote 16, at 553-56.
224. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, BiologicalOpinion on 1993 Operationof the FederalColumbia
River Power System 10-11, 15 (1993); see also Mark A. Eames, The Endangered Species Act, the
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operations satisfied both criteria, NMFS again issued a "no jeopardy"
opinion, including in its BiOp the rather modest goal of stabilizing salmon
populations within four salmon life cycles, or about fifteen years.' Idaho
and Oregon promptly filed suit, claiming that the 1993 BiOp violated the ESA.
The states alleged that the two-step standard for determining jeopardy
was arbitrary z 6 and in March 1994, federal district judge Malcolm Marsh
agreed. Marsh determined that both parts ofNMFS's two-part jeopardy test
were flawed. First, he concluded that NMFS's explanation of why it chose
the years 1986-90 for the baseline period, years of drought and low salmon
runs-allegedly to promote "consistent management practices"--was
neither factually accurate nor biologically sound. 7 NMFS had in fact
employed longer baselines in its 1992 BiOp," 8 and Judge Marsh decided
that the "consistent management practices" standard was biologically
suspect because it "necessarily focuses more upon system capabilitythan
upon the needs of the species." 9 The choice of a short baseline period of
drought years made it relatively easy for NMFS to produce a "no jeopardy"
BiOp by claiming that proposed action would actually improve the status
quo. Unfortunately for NMFS, Judge Marsh determined that its focus on the
"status quo rather than the stabilization of the species" was arbitrary
decisionmaking. 2
Second, NMFS's "no jeopardy" decision was flawed because it relied on
life-cycle modeling that discounted pessimistic assumptions."l Judge Marsh
determined that NMFS's decision to disregard worst-case consequences
"without well-reasoned analysis and without considering the full range of
risk assumptions" was arbitrary" 2 This approach allowed NMFS to inflate
the confidence levels of its optimistic projections and to ignore completely
FederalColumbiaRiver PowerSystem, and the NationalMarineFisheriesService, 25 Envtl. L. 389,
395-96(1995).
225. See Eames, supra note 224, at 396.
226. See Will Whelan, Idaho'sStrategy in Idaho Department of Fish & Game v. National Marine

Fisheries Service, 25 Envtl. L. 399,401 (1995).
227. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 893 (D. Or.

1994).
228. In 1992, NMFS used a baseline period of 1984-90 for juvenile salmon and a 1975-90 period

for adult salmon. See id
229. Id. (emphasis in original).

230. Id
231. See id. at 897. NMFS employed three life-cycle models to predict the effect of proposed
hydroelectric operations on salmon populations, all of which included numerous uncertainties. Judge
Marsh referred to them as "educated guesswork based on 'crude assumptions.'" Id
232. Id. at 898-99.
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the risks associated with small populations, where inbreeding and
environmental catastrophes can produce extinctions. 3
To remedy its flawed methodology and arbitrary decisionmaking, Judge
Marsh suggested that NMFS modify its analysis in two ways: (1) consider
alternative baseline periods, and (2) satisfy the ESA's directive of
employing "best available" scientific information by considering the views
of "well-qualified scientists such as the fisheries biologists from the states
and tribes," the very entities challenging the NMFS BiOp. 2 4 Judge Marsh
concluded his opinion by suggesting that, given the state of Columbia Basin
salmon runs, small, incremental steps would not satisfy the ESA:
[T]he process is seriously, "significantly," flawed because it is too
heavily geared towards a status quo that has allowed all forms of river
activity to proceed in a deficit situation-that is, relatively small steps,
minor improvements and adjustments-when the situation literally
cries out for a major overhaul. Instead of looking for what can be
done to protect the species from jeopardy, NMFS and the other action
agencies have narrowly focused their attention on what the
establishment is capable of handling with minimal disruption.235
2.

The Evolution of the 1995-99 BiOp: CompromisingSalmon
Protection

While the litigation over NMFS's 1993 jeopardy standard was underway,
NMFS issued a new BiOp to govern hydroelectric operations for the fiveyear period of 1994-98, which soon produced additional litigation. On
March 16, 1994, just twelve days before the court struck down the 1993
BiOp, NMFS released the new multi-year BiOp.236 The new BiOp called for
an additional 500,000 acre-feet of storage to be devoted to improved fish
233. See id at 897-99 (noting that factoring in worst-case scenarios would lower NMFS's confidence
level that salmon populations would rebound to 1990 levels by 2008 to 50% probability).
234. Id, at 893, 900 (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). Oregon intervened in support of Idaho,
while the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Yakama reservations and the Nez
Perce Tribe participated as amici in support of the two states. See id. at 890-91. In 1994, the Ninth
Circuit reiterated Judge Marsh's admonition to consult expert biologists employed by the states and
tribes, in a case involving similar language in the Northwest Power Act. See Northwest Resource Info.
Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1389, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994), discussed
in Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supranote 221, at 44-49.
235. Idaho Dep "tofFish & Game, 850 F. Supp. at 900.
236. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., EndangeredSpecies Act Section 7 ConsultationRegarding
1994-98 Operation ofthe FederalColumbia River PowerSystem andJuvenile TransportationProgram
in 1994-98, at 7-8 (1994).
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flows in the Snake River. It also called for a lowering of Lake Roosevelt,
the reservoir formed by Grand Coulee Dam, to 1277 feet to help boost fish
flows on the Columbia. 7 Environmentalists challenged that BiOp as well,
claiming that it violated the ESA by erroneously relying on truck and barge
transport to conclude that hydroelectric operations would not jeopardize the
continued existence of the species." 8 Since NMFS had already reinitiated
consultation on the multi-year BiOp, the court stayed the proceeding to give
the agency time to bring the new BiOp into compliance with the ESA. 9
In January 1995, NMFS began circulating a revised series of draft BiOps
which would eventually become the 1995-99 BiOp, superseding the 199498 BiOp.24 ° The progression of some of the provisions in these draft BiOps
is instructive. The first draft of the 1995-99 BiOp was released for review
by the operating agencies on December 30, 1994. Responding to claims that
no changes in the status quo should be made until there was proof that
changes would produce benefits, the draft declared that "the ESA does not
require that the burden of proof be put on listed species."241 It further
observed that "[t]he evidence suggests.., that transportation alone is not
likely the solution to rebuilding listed salmon populations."242 The draft also
called for an additional 3.5 million acre-feet of storage in Canadian
reservoirs for fish flow augmentation in the Columbia River, an additional
million acre-feet of upper Snake Basin storage for fish flows by 2002 (onehalf million acre-feet by 1999), lowering of the lower Snake River
reservoirs to near minimum operating pool, and immediate planning for a
drawdown of the lower Snake River reservoirs to natural river level.243 A
detailed schedule of minimum flows was also included, as was a
justification for the prescribed flows; for example, the document called for
biweekly average flows in the Snake River of 85,000 to 100,000 cubic feet

237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See Volkman, supranote 219, at 57.
240. See Brief for Federal Appellees at 11, American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv. (9th
Cir. 1998) (No. 97-36159).
241. National Marine Fisheries Serv., PredecisionalESADocument 10,945 (released to operating
agencies Dec. 30, 1994).
242. Id. at 10,946.

243. See id.at 10,957, 10,960-61.
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per second from April 10 to June 20 and 50,000 to 55,000 cubic feet per
second from June 21 to August 31 '
A subsequent draft, issued on January 25, 1995, included for the first
time a conclusion that proposed hydroelectric operations would jeopardize
the existence of listed salmon, although it suggested that adoption of a
"reasonable and prudent alternative" could avoid jeopardy.245 The suggested
alternative contained the same flow targets and reservoir drawdowns as the
earlier drait 2. but NMFS now began to define species jeopardy differently,
distinguishing between survival and recovery, requiring a "high probability"
of survival but only a "moderate to high" likelihood of recovery.24 7 A
February 24, 1995, draft included a provision making "economic
mitigation" measures, such as extending irrigators' pumps to reach the
lowered reservoir level, a prerequisite to any drawdown of John Day
reservoir."
The final BiOp, released on March 2, 1995, contained the same flow
schedule as in the December draft, but required operating agencies only to
"take into account the goal of meeting a seasonal average flow
objective; 24 9 there was no requirement to actually achieve a biweekly
average flow, as in the December draft." Similarly, the requirements to

obtain 3.5 million acre-feet of Canadian storage and one million acre-feet
of Idaho storage disappeared, replaced by vague exhortations to release

water for fish flow enhancementY 1 The elevation of Grand Coulee
244. See id at 10,956. The document called for flows in the Columbia of 220,000 to 260,000 cubic
feet per second from April 20 to June 30, and 200,000 cubic feet per second from July 1 to August 3 1.
Seeii
245. National Marine Fisheries Serv., EndangeredSpecies Act-Section 7 Consultation- Reinitiation
of Consultation on 1994-98 Operation of the FederalColumbia River Power System and Juvenile
TransportationProgramin 1994-98, at 95-96 (predecisional document, Jan. 25, 1995).
246. See id at 100, 104-05.
247. See id at 16 app. 1.
248. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Drat Biological Opinion 16 (distributed to operating
agencies Feb. 24, 1995).
249. National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion on Reinitiation of Consultationon 1994-98
Operation ofthe FederalColumbiaRiver Power System andJuvenile TransportationProgram in 1995
and Future Years 103-04 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 BiOp].
250. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. A flow standard that must be met twice a week
obviously provides much more dependable flows than one requiring attainment of a seasonal average,
for in the latter situation high spring flows may be justification for low summer flows.
251. The 1995 BiOp simply required BPA to negotiate for Canadian storage and stated that the
Bureau of Reclamation "should take all reasonable steps to secure additional water," although NMFS
expressed doubt that the United States could convince Canada to draw down reservoirs like the Arrow
reservoir. See 1995 BiOp, supra note 249, at 95, 98-101.
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reservoir, earlier set at 1277 feet, was now set three feet higher.2 2 The draft
retained the provision conditioning the drawdown of the John Day reservoir
minimum operating pool on the moving of irrigation pumps, although
NMFS stated that "[t]he extension of pumping facilities should be
undertaken immediately by the fastest means available." 3
Most significantly, the final 1995-99 BiOp adopted a dual probability
standard for jeopardy: proposed actions must demonstrate a "high
likelihood" of species survival, but only a "moderate" likelihood of species
recovery.' The BiOp defined a moderate likelihood as a fifty-percent
probability." 5 It also eliminated an interim twenty-four-year period by
which to judge survival and recovery thresholds. 6 Moreover, the BiOp
completely ignored adverse effects on critical habitat."7 The BiOp made no
attempt to justify any of these changes on biological grounds; NMFS
explained them only as reasonable accommodations to cost concerns and
other system uses. 8 None of the new compromised measures was subjected
to biological modeling, so NMFS could not be assured that its selected
"reasonable and prudent alternative" would in fact avoid species jeopardy,
an apparent statutory violation. 9 All of the eleventh-hour changes were
concessions to the status quo against which Judge Marsh had earlier
warned; 26 0 none favored salmon.
The revised BiOp continued to rely heavily on a program of transporting
juvenile fish downstream by truck and barge instead of improving river

252. See id at 95.
253. Id at 113. "Minimum operating pool" is the lowest reservoir level at which navigation locks can
operate. See Blumm et aL, BeyondParity,supra note 221, at 55 n.203.
254. See 1995 BiOp supranote 249, at 14.
255. See id at 79.
256. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 40,
American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Sere. (D. Or. 1996) (Civ. No. 96-00384-MA) [hereinafter
American Rivers' 1996 Memorandum].
257. See Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4, 16-17, American Rivers v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv. (D. Or. 1997) (Civ. No. 96-00384-MA) [hereinafter American Rivers' 1997
Memorandum].
258. See American Rivers' 1996 Memorandum, supranote 256, at 43.
259. See ia at 43-44 (citing Idaho Dep't ofFish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Sere., 850
F. Supp. 886, 891-93 (D. Or. 1994); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Department of Transp., 95 F.3d 892,

899 (9th Cir. 1996)).
260. See text accompanying supranote 235.
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conditions.2 61 NMFS estimated that about seventy-four percent of Snake
River spring/summer chinook arriving at Lower Granite Dam would be
transported at river flows between 85,000 and 100,000 cubic feet per
second. 62 The BiOp promised that NMFS would revisit the transportation
issue in late 1999 upon the expiration of the 1995-99 BiOp. 263 At that point,
NMFS will make a long-term decision as to whether transportation can
recover listed salmon, or whether dam breaching will be necessary. 64
3.

American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service: Retreating
from the "Complete Overhaul" Call

A coalition of environmental groups challenged the revised BiOp,
claiming that it violated the ESA by authorizing mortalities of up to eightysix percent of juvenile Snake River sockeye and spring/summer chinook
and up to ninety-nine percent of fall chinook.265 The environmental groups
also challenged the dual standards for jeopardy, dropping the twenty-fouryear recovery period, ignoring critical habitat, and failing to implement key
measures like the drawdown of John Day reservoir."6 Although Judge
Marsh noted that "[a]s a long-time observer and examiner" of salmon
restoration efforts, he could not "help but question the soundness of
[NMFS's] selected level of risk tolerance," he concluded that the ESA "says
nothing about risk tolerance and the limits of judicial review dictate that I

261. See 1995 BiOp, supra note 249, at 80; see also Volkman, supra note 219, at 57 (noting that
heavy emphasis on artificial transportation "raise[s] a number of issues about the fate of the Snake River
as a home for salmon"). Earlier, environmentalists had unsuccessfully challenged an ESA permit that
NMFS issued to the Corps of Engineers allowing the transportation program to proceed under section
10(a)(1) of the statute as a measure to "enhance the... survival of the affected species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(1)(A) (1994). The environmentalists contended that the transportation permit violated section
10(d) of the ESA, which requires that such "enhancement" permits be consistent with the ecosystem
preservation policy of the statute. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 153 l(b), 1539(d) (1994). Judge Marsh rejected the
challenge, however, noting that although the transportation program had been employed for over twenty
years with no success in stemming the decline of wild salmon populations, there was no "direct causal
link between the salmon's decline and the transportation program." Therefore, he would not substitute
his judgment for that of NMFS, because the agency had made a reasoned evaluation of relevant
information. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 93-469-MA
(D. Or. Apr. 30, 1993).
262. See 1995 BiOp, supra note 249, at 112.
263. See id. at 93-94.
264. See id. at 92-94.
265. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 96-00384-MA (D. Or. Apr. 3, 1997).
266. See American Rivers' 1996 Memorandum, supra note 256, at 39-48; American Rivers' 1997
Memorandum, supra note 257, at 4, 6-17.
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not interfere with a federal agencies' [sic] exercise of professional judgment
or their reasoned decisions. 26 7
Influencing the court was NMFS's claim that it was implementing an
"ecosystem management" approach to salmon recovery by establishing a
systematic comparison of the ability of transported fish to return to spawn
as compared with the fish left in the river.268 In addition, NMFS noted that
other species, like bull trout and sturgeon, might suffer from the higher river
flows that the environmentalists sought, which also persuaded the court to
affirm NMFS. 26 9 Finally, unlike the case three years earlier, the Columbia
Basin tribes were split over the BiOp, as the upper basin Colville and
Spokane tribes sought to protect reservoir levels in Lake Roosevelt, formed
by Grand Coulee Dam, which might be lowered to achieve the river flows
that the lower basin tribes advocated.2 7' Thus, three years after he called for
a "major overhaul" in system operations,27 1 Judge Marsh upheld the revised
BiOp as not irrational, essentially allowing NMFS to proceed with its
experiment comparing the survival levels of transported versus in-river fish
until late 1999.272 In March 1999, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Marsh's
decision.
4.

The Searchfor Better Science and the PATH Process

Judge Marsh struck down NMFS's 1993 BiOp, in large part because it
ignored the biological advice of the states and tribes.274 In response, one
267. American Rivers v. NationalMarineFisheriesServ., No. 96-00384-MA, at 26.
268. See id. at 11.
269. See id. at 5-6.
270. See U at 6-7. Idaho also flip-flopped. The lead plaintiffin the challenge to the 1993 BiOp, the
state now (under a different political administration) supported NMFS's revised BiOp. See id.
271. See supratext accompanying note 235. Influencing the court was NMFS's acknowledgment that
"without major modifications to the Snake and Columbia River dams, it is unlikely [in-river] survivals
can be sufficiently improved to ensure the operation of [the dams] does not impede survival and
recovery of listed Snake River salmon." American Rivers v. NationalMarineFisheriesServ., No. 96-

00384-MA, at 13.
272. Several independent scientific reports have recently concluded that transportation is incapable
ofproducing survival levels sufficient to recover Columbia Basin salmon. See Michael C. Blumm et al.,
Saving Snake River Waterand Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological,Economic, andLegalCasefor
Breachingthe Lower Snake Dams, LoweringJohn Day Reservoir, andRestoring NaturalRiver Flows,
28 Envtl. L. 997, 1012-23 (1999) [hereinafter Blumm et al., The CaseforDamBreaching] (discussing
eight such studies).

273. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 1999),
discussed infra notes 505,509,521, and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:519, 1999

innovation of the NMFS 1995-99 BiOp on hydroelectric operations was to
create an independent working group of scientists to assist NMFS in
gathering and evaluating the best available scientific information.275 This
group, now known as the Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses
(PATH), is comprised of about twenty-five federal, state, tribal, and
independent scientists who operate pursuant to accepted scientific
procedures and whose work is peer-reviewed.276
The PATH scientists have reached at least interim conclusions that
seriously question the BiOp's heavy reliance on transportation. For
example, a September 1998 report concluded that breaching the four lower
Snake Dams would double the likelihood of recovering the listed Snake
River salmon, while continuing the transportation program would decrease
recovery chances. 277 The final PATH report for 1998 determined that
breaching the dams would give Snake River fall chinook a one hundred
percent probability of recovery and spring/summer chinook a forty-seven
to sixty-five percent probability, depending on how quickly dam breaching
got underway.278 On the other hand, the PATH scientists estimated recovery
chances under transportation at merely fifteen to thirty-five percent.279
Ironically, NMFS's hydropower BiOp may have set in motion a scientific
process that shows that the "reasonable and prudent alternative" the agency
selected in its BiOp was based on misguided science.
B.

HatcheryBiOps

Hatcheries have been part of the Columbia River ecosystem for over a
century. As early as 1877, the Oregon and Washington Fish Propagating
Company, with assistance from the federal government, established the first
Columbia River Basin hatchery on the Clackamas River in Oregon. 8 1 This
and other early efforts were modest and had little effect on the number of
fish returning to the river. Nonetheless, they forever changed salmon
275. See 1995 BiOp, supranote 249, at 6.
276. See Blumm et al., The CaseforDam Breaching,supra note 272, at 1020-23.
277. See Conclusionsand Recommendationsfiom the PATH Weight ofthe Evidence Workshop 18-19
(1998) [hereinafter PATHReport], discussedin Blumm et al., The CaseforDam Breaching,supranote
272, at 1021; infra notes 529-31 and accompanying text.
278. See PA TH report,supranote 277, at 24.
279. See id; see also Margaret Hollenbach, PATH Presents FY 1998 FinalReport, 25 Columbia
Basin Bull. 2 (Dec. 11, 1998) <http://www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull_25.htm>.
280. See Livingston Stone, ArtificialPropagationofSalmon, in The Northwest Salmon Crisis,supra
note 3, at 54.
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management in the basin.281 Every year since 1888, when Oregon took over
the Clackamas River hatchery, one or more state, federal,
or tribal
28 2
hatcheries have introduced hatchery-raised fish into the basin.
Originally, fishery managers viewed the practice of introducing

hatchery-raised fish into the basin as a means of sustaining an alreadydeclining salmon harvest.283 When that view proved to be inaccurate 2 hey
continued hatchery production as a panacea for habitat loss from

hydroelectric development and as a means to safeguard wild salmon runs
by transplanting upriver populations cut off by dams to unrestricted lower
2

river tributaries, where it was hoped they would establish new wild rms. 11
Despite massive fiscal outlays and literally billions of hatchery fish
introduced into the basin,286 hatchery production failed to protect wild

salmon, just as it failed as a fish harvest tool.
Pacific salmon are a highly specialized, genetically diverse family of

species susceptible to a broad range of deleterious effects from the
introduction of hatchery fish into streams that still support wild salmon
populations. 287 Because of their high affinity for natal streams and their
reproductive isolation, salmon populations are genetically optimized to

survive in their local environmental conditions. Hatchery fish threaten that
optimization because they carry a different genetic makeup, often illadapted to the local environment, and pass those genes to the wild

281. See The Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: RestorationofSalmonid Fishesin
the ColumbiaRiver Ecosystem 377-78 (pre-publication copy 1996) [hereinafter Return to the River I],
Executive Summary reprintedat The Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: An Ecological
Vision for the Recovery of the ColumbiaRiver Salmon, 28 Envtl. L. 503 (1998).
282. See Return to the River I, supra note 28 1, at 378.
283. Fishery managers assumed that natural spawning was inherently inefficient and, intoxicated by
the prospect of an inexhaustible resource, believed they could improve on nature and build a fishery
capable of supporting an unrestricted salmon harvest. See id. at 378-79.
284. See id.
285. The Grand Coulee Fish Management Project collected fish at Rock Island Dam for
transplantation to lower river tributaries and hatcheries to compensate for the loss of over 1100 miles
of upstream habitat loss caused by constructing Grand Coulee Dam. Similarly, the Lower Snake
Compensation Plan produced hatchery steelhead and chinook to mitigate habitat loss in the Snake River
Basin from construction of Ice Harbor, Lower Monumental, Little Goose, and Lower Granite dams. See
id at 393-95.
286. Hatchery funding has consistently dominated salmon restoration, outstripping expenditures for
research, habitat restoration, and improving salmon passage through dams. See id. at 388-388A.
287. See Michael L. Goodman, Preservingthe Genetic Diversity ofSalmonid Stocks: A Callfor
FederalRegulationofHatchery Programs,20 Envtl. L. 111, 115-18 (1990) (describing salmonid lifehistory characteristics).
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population through hybridization.28 8 If sustained, introgression-infusing
non-native genes into native populations through hybridization with
hatchery fish-will eventually replace the wild population's genetic makeup
with less-adapted hatchery genes, decreasing the wild population's ability
to reproduce and survive. Hatchery fish also compete with wild fish for
limited food resources, in some cases prey on wild fish, and act as vectors
for disease transmission from hatchery to wild populations.2 89 Even so,
hatcheries continue to play a large role in the Columbia River system.29
1.

The 1995-98 Hatchery BiOp: An ESA Overlay to the Patchworkof
Hatchery Management

A patchwork of federal and state statutes authorize hatchery programs in
the Columbia River Basin to support salmon harvests and to mitigate the

effects of habitat loss from hydroelectric development. Each hatchery is
subject to the standards of its authorizing statute. NMFS's decisions to list
the salmon under the ESA provided a framework for considering the
combined effect of all hatchery programs on an ecosystem-wide scale.29'
In 1995, NMFS considered the effect of seventy-one federal and nonfederal hatchery programs affecting Snake River salmon, operated by five
federal agencies and three states.292 NMFS consulted internally on the
operation of twenty-five hatcheries in Oregon and Washington293 under the
Mitchell Act's authority "to provide for the conservation and maintenance
of the fishery resources of the Columbia River. 2 94 From 1995 to 1998,
288. Hatchery fish are genetically distinct from wild populations for a number of reasons. For
instance, hatchery populations stocked from a particular stream are often dispersed to areas other than
their natal streams. In addition, through the hatchery-rearing process the population can undergo a
number of genetic transformations, ranging from active selection for particular characteristics to natural
processes such as genetic drift, which is the random change in gene frequencies over time. After release
into streams hatchery and wild fish interbreed, resulting in offspring of mixed genetic stock. See id. at
127-34.
289. See id. at 134-39.
290. For a discussion of "supplementation," a new method of using hatchery fish to produce
spawning fish rather than harvestable fish, see infra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.
291. The continuing litigation in UnitedStates v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1988), which
created the Columbia River Fish Management Plan, largely governs coordinated regulation of hatchery
fish production. See Mary Christina Wood, Reclaimingthe NaturalRivers: The EndangeredSpecies Act
as Applied to EndangeredRiver Ecosystems, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 222-24 (1998).
292. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinionfor 1995 to 1998 HatcheryOperations
in the Columbia River Basin 8-11 (1995) [hereinafter 1995-98 HatcheryBiOp].
293. See id. at 14.
294. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 755-757 (1994).
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FWS proposed to operate fifteen hatcheries and twelve satellite facilities in
the Columbia and Snake River Basins,2 95 mostly as part of the Lower Snake
River Compensation Plan,2 96 to mitigate habitat loss from construction and
operation of the four lower Snake River dams.297 The Bonneville Power
Administration proposed to support the Umatilla hatchery on the Columbia
River below McNary Dam "to re-establish salmon and enhance native
steelhead stocks in the Umatilla River Basin."298 The Corps of Engineers
proposed to support seven hatcheries and two satellite facilities in the
Columbia, Willamette, and Clearwater Rivers to mitigate habitat loss from
construction of dams in the Columbia River Basin.2" The Bureau of Indian
Affairs proposed, on behalf of the Colville Confederated Tribes, to support
a sockeye salmon hatchery in the upper Columbia River. 00 Finally, NMFS
also considered the effects of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho state hatchery
programs operating under ESA section 10 incidental take permits." 1 In
combination, the programs annually release nearly 200 million hatcheryraised fish.30 2
In its BiOp, NMFS analyzed the hatchery programs in comparison to
goals it established in its proposed recovery plan for Snake River salmon,0 3
which it issued after the agencies conducted their biological assessments.
Following an analysis of the environmental baseline for Snake River
sockeye, spring/summer chinook, and fall chinook, NMFS concluded that
the proposed hatchery operations would jeopardize the continued existence
of each species because the hatchery operations were inconsistent with the
proposed recovery plan. NMFS expressed particular concern that hatchery
production was exceeding the basin's carrying capacity for Snake River
295. The hatcheries included three to mitigate the effects of the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington,
and one on the Deschutes River to support the tribal fishery of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation.
See 1995-98 HatcheryBiOp, supranote 292, at 15. For a discussion of the Mitchell Act's relationship
to the salmon fishery, see Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, The MitchellAct: AnAnaysis (1981).

296. The Water Resources Development Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-587, § 145, 90 Stat. 2917
(1976), authorized the Lower Columbia River Compensation Plan "to mitigate losses caused by the
construction and operation of the four lower Snake River dams and navigation lock projects." 1995-98
HatcheryBiOp, supra note 292, at 15.
297. See 1995-98 HatcheryBiOp, supra note 292, at 14-15.
298. Id. at 15.
299. See id. at 16.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 6. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994) (incidental take permits).
302. See 1995-98HatcheryBiOp, supranote 292, at 6.
303. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., ProposedRecovery Planfor Snake River Salmon V-4-1
to V-4-49 (1995) [hereinafter ProposedRecovery Plan].
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salmon. 3" The agency therefore proposed a cap on hatchery fish releases for
nonrecovery purposes at 1994 levels (20.2 million in the Snake River and
197.4 million total).30 5 In addition, NMFS determined that the proposed
hatchery programs would allow levels of genetic introgression, competition,
and predation on listed salmon above what the recovery plan proposed.3 6
Because the hatchery programs as proposed were inconsistent with the
recovery plan proposal, NMFS concluded that they would likely jeopardize
the continued existence of listed Snake River salmon. However, NMFS
determined that the hatchery programs could proceed by adopting
reasonable and prudent alternatives which NMFS designed to address the
differences between the proposed hatchery programs and the proposed
recovery plan." 7
2.

Supplementation: The Nez Perce TribalHatchery BiOp

In 1995 the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, a technical
and policy-coordinating body representing the four lower Columbia Basin
tribes with treaty fishing rights, released its own plan for salmon restoration
in the Columbia River Basin.0 ' Like NMFS's proposed recovery plan, the
tribal plan recognized a role for hatchery production to restore salmon runs.
Unlike NMFS's plan, the tribal plan relied on supplementation, a form of
hatchery production less intrusive to wild salmon populations than
traditional hatchery production.0 9
Supplementation attempts to avoid the detrimental effects of traditional
hatchery practices by producing fish capable of spawning in the wild.10 By
using only native wild broodstock and creating natural conditions in the
hatchery, proponents of supplementation believe they can use artificial
propagation as a viable restoration tool. The goal is to produce fish

304. See 1995-98 Hatchery BiOp, supranote 292, at 36.
305. See ProposedRecovery Plan,supra note 303, at V-4-29 to V-4-31.
306. Because the largest hatchery steelhead are known to prey on sockeye salmon, the 1995-98
Hatchery BiOp adopted a proposed recovery plan provision that would- limit the size of steelhead
released to between 170 and 220 mm in length. See 1995-98 HatcheryBiOp, supranote 292, at 60, 62.
307. See id. at 64.
308. See Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Comm'n, Wy-Kan-Ush-Mi Wa-Kish-Wit: Spirit of the
Salmon (1995) [hereinafter Spirit ofthe Salmon], discussed in Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supra note
221, at 75-83.
309. See id. at 5B-14.
310. See Jack K. Sterne, Jr., Supplementation of Wild Salmon Stocks: A Curefor the Hatchery
Problem or More ProblemHatcheries?,23 Coastal Mgmt. 123, 127 (1995).
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genetically indistinguishable from wild populations which, when introduced
into streams with wild runs, will become part of a healthy wild population.
This technique can also be used to reintroduce a species into an area from
which it was extirpated."1 ' Supplementation is not without critics, however.
NMFS, the Northwest Power Planning Council, and environmentalists
maintain that there remain risks of genetic introgression; these entities
generally support only a cautious, experimental approach to using
supplementation."'
Despite its own misgivings over supplementation, NMFS issued a
biological opinion in 1997 on the Nez Perce Tribe's hatchery, concluding
that the hatchery was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
listed salmon and steelhead?" The Nez Perce hatchery is subject to section
7 consultation because it is funded by the federal Bonneville Power
Administration and Bureau of Indian Affairs. This supplementation
program, located in the Clearwater River sub-basin of the Snake River,
proposed a maximum production within ten years of 768,000 spring
chinook, two million subyearling smolt fall chinook, and 800,000
subyearling early-run fall chinook 314 Using rearing techniques characteristic
of supplementation, the Nez Perce hatchery proposed to outplant sufficient
fish into tributaries of the Clearwater River to establish healthy, harvestable
runs over a twenty-year period.' In addition to the innovative rearing
techniques, the Nez Perce hatchery proposed a three-level, ecosystem
approach to monitor and evaluate the program." 6
NMFS allowed the Nez Perce hatchery to proceed even though it
concluded that "[a]ny further degradation of [the listed species' biological
requirements] would have a significant impact" on those species.317 As it did
with the 1995-98 hatchery BiOp, NMFS compared the proposal against its
proposed recovery plan. For most listed salmon, the greatest risk of the Nez
Perce program would be the potential co-occurrence of hatchery fish with
wild fish in either the Clearwater River or the Columbia River migration

311. See id.at 128.
312. See id.
313. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., EndangeredSpecies Act Section 7 Consultation:Biological
Opinion: NezPerce TribalHatchey1998-2002 HatcheryOperations28 (1997) [hereinafterNez Perce

Biop].
314. See id. at 3.
315. "Outplant" means to place fish in streams different from those of their natal origin. See id.at 4.
316. See id at 7-8.
317. Id. at 9.
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corridor."' The program would minimize risks because the number of fish
released would be less than the cap for the Snake River that NMFS set in
its proposed recovery plan.319 The Nez Perce program also proposed to limit
the amount of genetic introgression into wild populations consistent with
NMFS's proposed recovery plan.320 Therefore, NMFS determined that the
program would not likely jeopardize the listed species' continued existence.
NMFS's treatment of hatchery programs in these two BiOps is consistent
with the trend of considering hatchery programs collectively at the
ecosystem level. NMFS's use of its proposed recovery plan as a baseline for
judging the threat of hatchery programs to salmon is one example of this
trend.32 ' Another example is Congress's directive to the Northwest Power
Planning Council (NWPPC) to review all federally funded hatchery
programs in the Columbia River Basin and to recommend a coordinated
hatchery management policy.3 22 Part of that directive was a review of
hatchery programs by the Independent Scientific Advisory Board to advise
the Council on that policy. So far, the result is a draft policy statement that
will form the basis for a final report to Congress; the draft policy calls for
integrating natural salmon production with hatchery production at the subbasin level, based on sound scientific principles.3"
Long-term hatchery management, however, is subject to the outcome of
negotiations between the United States v. Oregon parties, as well as further
consultation with NMFS.324 The NWPPC draft policy statement did not
incorporate the perspective of those two processes because NMFS has yet
to release its updated consultation on Columbia River Basin hatchery
practices, and ongoing negotiations between the United States v. Oregon
parties are not conducted in public.325 As a result, it is uncertain whether the
policy will produce any lasting changes in Columbia Basin hatchery
management.

318. Seeid. at 10-12.
319. See id. at 28.
320. See id. at 23-25.
321. NMFS will likely continue this trend when it updates the 1995-98 Hatchery BiOp sometime in
1999. See id. at 27-28.
322. See Northwest Power Planning Council, DraftNPPC ArtificialProductionPolicy Statement:
Columbia Basin Hatcheries:A Programin Transition 1 (1999).
323. See Barry Espenson, HatcheryPolicy ProposalGoes Public,33 Columbia Basin Bull. 5 (Feb.
26, 1999) <http://www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull_33.htm>.
324. See id; United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1988).
325. See Espenson, supra note 323.
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C.

HarvestBiOps

Overexploitation of the region's salmon catalyzed the ubiquitous use of
hatcheries which are now the foundation of both ocean and in-river harvest
programs.326 Once nearly unregulated, the salmon harvest has evolved into
an institutionally managed system of allocating the resource between
commercial, recreational, and tribal harvesters.327 Recent harvests pose less
of a threat to salmon survival and recovery than do hydropower, hatchery
practices, and habitat loss, because harvest managers have limited the rate
of harvest to account for those other threats.328 Still, any harvest of listed
salmon directly affects the population by reducing the number of spawning
adults returning to natal streams.329

Although listed salmon are not the object of harvest activities, they
nevertheless suffer some incidental take in both ocean and in-river
harvests.330 To minimize incidental take, harvest decisions are subject to a

number of management plans derived from a maze of treaty rights, court
orders, and administrative actions.331 Despite this apparently coordinated
harvest management, salmon continue to decline throughout the basin. 32
With the listing of Columbia River Basin salmon, NMFS has become a
principal decisionmaker in the area of harvest management. In fact, NMES

is arguably now the key harvest manager because, without its approval of
incidental takes as part of the consultation process, those harvests would

326. See Marshall McDonald, Salmon Fisheriesofthe Columbia Basin, in The Northwest Salmon
Crisis,supra note 3, at 29-31 (arguing that overfishing was early cause of salmon decline). Two years
after the 1894 McDonald report, W.A. Wilcox of the U.S. Fish Commission visited the basin and argued
in a local newspaper interview for the hatcheries to satisfy increasing demands for salmon and to offset
continuing declines in the harvest. See Fish andFisheries,Morning Oregonian, 1896, in The Northwest
Salmon Crisis, supranote 3, at 31-33.
327. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the Native
Nations on EnvironmentalIssues. A PartialCritique of the Clinton Administration'sPromisesand
Performance,25 Envtl. L. 733,770-78 (1995) (discussing current harvest management and regulation).
328. See National Research Council, Upstream:Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest 254
(1996) [hereinafter Upstream].
329. See Return to the River I,supranote 281, at 358.
330. See ProposedRecovery Plan,supra note 303, at ES-6.
331. See Wood, supranote 327, at 770-71; see also Upstream, supranote 328, at 257 (discussing
declines in ocean and in-river harvests during 1990s to less than half that amount in 1980s).
332. One study argues that harvest management is ineffective because salmon are not managed
"according to the productive capacities of the individual stocks." Instead of targeting spawning
escapement to salmon-producing streams, management plans aggregate the stocks into escapement goals
at the hydroelectric dams, where there are fish-counting facilities. See Return to the River I, supranote
281, at 362-63.
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require that private individuals secure an incidental take permit from
NMFS, a time-consuming and expensive process that would include
preparation of a habitat conservation plan.333 Thus, NMFS harvest BiOps
effectively authorize private takes of listed species.
1.

The 1996 Ocean HarvestBiOp

Harvest management of Pacific salmon has both international and
national components. Internationally, the Pacific Salmon Treaty between
the United States and Canada, implemented through the Pacific Salmon
Commission (PSC), governs the allocation of salmon between the two
countries.334 Negotiations over this shared resource are often tense, resulting
in deadlock and conflict between these neighboring nations.335 Within the
United States, commercial and recreational harvests off the coasts of
California, Oregon, and Washington are managed by the Pacific Fisheries
Management Council (PFMC) under authority of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976.336 Through the advice of a
Salmon Technical Team and Salmon Advisory Subpanel, the PFMC
coordinates federal and state harvest activities.337 Ultimately, the Secretary
of Commerce, through NMFS, makes the final harvest decisions by
adopting a fishery management plan (FMP) 38 Because that plan is a federal
action, and because NMFS is also the regulatory authority for ESA
consultations on salmon, NMFS must consult internally as to whether the
plan is likely to jeopardize listed salmon.339

333. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)-(4) (1994) (incidental take statements as part of § 7
consultation), with 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (1994) (incidental take permits requiring
preparation of habitat conservation plan).
334. See Treaty with Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No.
11,091 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty]. United States
implementation of the treaty is authorized by the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3631-3644
(1994). See also Upstream, supranote 328, at 258-59.
335. See, eg., OfficialsAsk White House to Help Settle Salmon Fight,News Trib. (Tacoma), Oct. 13,
1998, at B5.
336. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994).
337. See Upstream, supra note 328, at 258.
338. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854.
339. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act-Section 7 Consultation:
Biological Opinion: The FisheryManagementPlanfor Commercialand RecreationalSalmon Fisheries
off the Coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Californiaof the Pacific FisheryManagement Council2
(1996) [hereinafter Ocean BiOp].
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In 1996, NMFS issued a biological opinion on the PFMC's fishery
management plan that for the first time considered the plan in terms of its

consistency with NMFS's proposed recovery plan.34° Of the Columbia River
Basin species, NMFS considered the Snake River sockeye, spring/summer
chinook, and fall chinook.34' NMFS proposed to continue operation of
ocean harvests under the FMP that, among other things, allocated the

allowable harvest rate, established managpment boundaries and zones, and
limited the size of fish caught and the allowable gear.342 Returns in the
1990s declined dramatically for all three Snake River species, in some cases

to record lows, and escapements were well below amounts needed for
species recovery.343
NMFS determined that the proposed FMP affected only Snake River fall

chinook. According to NMFS, the ocean harvests catch few if any Snake
River sockeye and only a small number of spring/summer chinook.34 A

lack of data, and uncertainty in estimated mortality from the ocean harvest,
made it impossible for NMFS to quantify the actual loss of fall chinook.345
However, by modeling harvest rates over a five-year period, NMFS

estimated that all ocean harvests combined took forty-three percent of listed
Snake River fall chinook.3 6 The PFMC harvest accounted for

approximately twenty-six percent of that total, with Alaskan and Canadian
harvests accounting for the remaining seventy-four percent.347
As it has done with hatchery BiOps,348 NMFS compared the ocean

harvest rate for Snake River fall chinook against its proposed recovery plan.
340. Prior to 1996, NMFS considered each year's harvest regulations, instead of considering the
programmatic goals in the fishery management plan. See i& at 1.
341. NMFS also considered the effect of the FMP on Sacramento River winter-run chinook, which
was the first salmon species listed under the ESA. See !&; 55 Fed. Reg. 12,831 (1990) (codified at 50
C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1998)); 55 Fed. Reg. 46,515 (1990) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 227A(e) (1998)).
Because that species is not part of the Columbia River ecosystem, it is not discussed here.
342. See Ocean BiOp,supra note 339, at 2-3.
343. See id.at 5-6.
344. Some sockeye are caught in ocean harvests, but these are likely descended from Fraser River
or Puget Sound stocks. Snake River spring chinook generally have already entered the river system by
the time the ocean harvest begins. NMFS was unable to estimate the amount of summer chinook caught
because of inconclusive data but agreed with the PFMC's Salmon Technical Team "that it is unlikely
that PFMC salmon fisheries significantly impact Snake River summer chinook." Id. at 10-12 (citing
Pacific Fishery Management Council, PreseasonReport I: Analysis ofCouncil-AdoptedManagement
Measuresfor 1995 Ocean Salmon Fisheries(1995)).
345. See id. at 13.
346. See id. at 13-14.
347. See id. at 14.
348. See supra notes 303-04,306-07,321, and accompanying text.
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The proposed plan adopted the management strategies of the PSC, which
aimed "to attain naturally spawning chinook escapement goals by 1998," '
as a baseline for deciding whether the FMP was likely to jeopardize the
species' continued existence. In this context, NMFS concluded that the
PSC's management strategies were unattainable in the short-term, and
therefore inadequate. The proposed recovery plan, however, relied on longterm goals set for the international PSC-goals that NMFS determined the
PSC could not meet.35 °
Approximately two-thirds of the ocean harvest mortality of Snake River
fall chinook is the result of harvests managed under the Pacific Salmon
Treaty.35' NMFS noted that since 1993 these harvests failed to meet the
proposed recovery plan's long-term goals for rebuilding chinook stocks.
Based on stock status at the time of the BiOp, NMFS determined that it
could no longer rely on an agreement between the United States and Canada
to protect Snake River fall chinook.352 Instead, NMFS decided that
additional short-term measures were necessary-measures it discussed with
U.S. fishery managers within the PSC and PFMC, but which were not
included in its recovery plan.353 Assuming the United States and Canada
could reach an agreement, NMFS proposed a thirty-percent reduction in
chinook ocean harvests for all U.S. and Canadian fisheries. If Canada would
not agree to additional reductions, however, NMFS proposed a fifty-percent
reduction in U.S. ocean harvests to account for lost benefits from a reduced
Canadian harvest. 54

349. Ocean BiOp, supra note 339, at 15-16.
350. See id. at 16.
351. See id.
352. See id. at 15-16.
353. See id. at 16-17.
354. See id.
at 17. After this Article went to press, on June 3, 1999, negotiators for the United States
and Canada announced an agreement which, if ratified by both countries, would establish new harvest
regimes, replacing expired versions of the Pacific Salmon Treaty. The new provisions call for
abundance-based harvest regulations, which will vary from year to year depending on abundance, to
replace the old fixed-quota ceilings. Under the new provisions, Canada will reduce harvests of chinook
offthe west coast of Vancouver Island, where about one-quarter of the fish are of Columbia River origin.
In return, U.S. fishermen will reduce their catch of Fraser River sockeye. At the insistence of the
Columbia Basin tribes, the agreement also includes a habitat component, the first time the treaty has
addressed habitat. The agreement also commits the two countries to establishing two bilaterally
managed funds (the U.S. share is $140 million over four years) to improve fisheries management and
scientific information, and to make institutional changes. A separate fund, to be established by the
United States and Washington State, will buy back fishing licenses to retire a portion of the state's
sockeye fishery and relieve pressure on the Fraser River sockeye. See generally Barry Espenson, Treaty
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In the absence of an agreement between the United States and Canada,
the ESA places the burden for salmon protection on the United States-in
this case, on the PFMC and its FMP. According to NMFS, the FMP was
inadequate to safeguard chinook because it did not provide for the shortterm harvest reductions described above and did not provide for weak-stock
protections called for in the proposed recovery plan.355 Consequently,
NMFS concluded that the FMP was likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of Snake River fall chinook.356 However, NMFS determined that
the species would not be jeopardized if the PFMC adopted two reasonable
and prudent alternatives. First, NMFS required the PFMC to amend its
fishery management plan to be consistent with NMFS's proposed recovery
plan. 57 Second, absent an agreement between the United States and Canada
adopting and implementing the proposed recovery plan's long-term goals,
NMFS required either a thirty-percent reduction in both U.S. and Canadian
harvests, or a fifty-percent reduction in U.S. harvests.358 In the end, the
Ocean BiOp accomplished two significant things: it required the PFMC to
implement NMFS's proposed recovery plan, and it made actual harvest
reductions dependent on the outcome of negotiations between the United
States and Canada under the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
2.

The 1998 SteelheadIn-River BiOp

Managing in-river harvests also plays a crucial role in determining the
future of listed salmon in the Columbia River Basin. The Columbia River
Compact between Washington and Oregon created an interstate agency that
allocates the in-river harvest between tribal and nontribal fishers.3 59 Not
until the tribes sued in federal court, however, were they granted a fair
apportionment of the harvest.6 ' The full extent of the tribes' rightincluding the right to fifty percent of the harvest-was recognized in United

Seen as Boon to Recovery, 46 Columbia Basin Bull. 2 (June 11, 1999) <http://www.nwppc.org/
bulletin/bull_46.htm#2>.
355. See Ocean BiOp, supranote 339, at 17-18, 32.
356. See id. at 32.
357. See id. at 34.
358. See id.

359. See United States v. Oregon, 699 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (D. Or. 1988).
360. See Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1973); see also Blumm &
Swift, supra note 2, at 449-53 (discussing the trilogy of Puyallup cases in the Supreme Court that
guaranteed tribes the right to take fish free from discriminatory state regulations).
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States v. Washington.3 6' That apportionment also governed in UnitedStates
v. Oregon,3 62 which continues to allocate salmon harvests in the Columbia
River. Since the late 1960s, the District Court of Oregon has overseen the
in-river harvest through its continuing jurisdiction in that case, which
created the judicially approved Columbia River Fish Management Plan
(CRFMP).363 Disputes over the in-river harvest are routinely resolved by
U.S. District Judge Malcolm Marsh.
A well-publicized dispute erupted in 1998 over tribal commercial harvest
of fall chinook. The tension began when NMFS's Regional Administrator,
William Stelle, Jr., suggested limiting harvest levels for the fall in-river
fishery, which would have significantly reduced the tribes' fall chinook
harvest. 3" Stelle proposed to limit the tribes' catch of listed steelhead from
twenty percent to between five and seven percent of the available harvest.
This reduction would have limited the tribes' fall chinook harvest because
steelhead are caught incidental to the fall chinook harvest. Although the
tribes had abstained from harvesting other listed species in the past,3 65 they
were reluctant to do so in this instance because the fall chinook harvest is
the tribes' last commercial fishery.3 66 Eventually, NMFS and the tribes
reached an agreement allowing a tribal harvest of fifteen to twenty percent,
a reduction from the thirty-two percent allowed under the CRFMP.367 When
NMFS and the tribes sought approval of the agreement from the United
States v. Oregon court, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho objected on the
ground that NMFS had not completed a BiOp addressing the effect of the
agreement on steelhead. s6s
The dispute, submitted to Judge Marsh, was significant for two reasons.
First, it had the potential to place the tribes' treaty rights at odds with

361. 384 F. Supp. 312,393,403-04 (W.D. Wash. 1974); see also Blumm & Swit, PiscaryProfit,
supra note 2, at 455-59 (discussing the case).
362. 699 F. Supp. at 1469.
363. In Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899,911 (D. Or. 1969), a companion case to UnitedStates
v. Oregon,Judge Belloni ruled that treaties entitled the tribes to a "fair share" of the harvests; in 1974,
Judge Belloni adopted the 50% harvest share, which Judge Boldt first applied in United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 393. See Blumm & Swift, PiscaryProfit,supra note 2, at 459 nn.248-50.
364. See Courtenay Thompson, Steelhead Suggestion Limits TribalHarvests, Oregonian, Apr. 13,
1998, at BI.
365. Even before NlIFS listed Columbia River Basin salmon, the tribes restricted their harvest levels
to protect summer chinook (1964) and spring chinook (1977). See id.
366. See id.
367. See United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513-MA, op. and order at 4 (D. Or. Sept. 3, 1998).
368. Seeid at3.
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section 7 of the ESA. The states argued that the ESA requires NMFS to
complete a BiOp in response to the CRFMP Technical Advisory
Committee's (TAC) biological assessment, which NMFS had not done.369
The tribes countered by contending that the ESA does not apply to the

tribes' treaty rights. 70 This would mean that NMFS could not directly
regulate the tribes' harvest, only other activities contributing to salmon
mortalities, such as other harvests and hydroelectric operations. Because

Judge Marsh resolved the dispute on another issue, he never reached that
critical question.
The issue on which the case turned was whether, as the states argued, the
ESA required NMFS to complete a BiOp on the CRFMP, instead of
reaching a stipulated agreement in lieu of consultation.37 ' NMFS admitted
that if it were to complete a BiOp, the result would be a jeopardy opinion,
but countered that there was no agency action triggering the consultation
process and therefore no need for a BiOp.372 Judge Marsh disagreed, noting
that the statute broadly defines agency action, and that a biological
assessment issued by the TAC was sufficient federal involvement to trigger
section 7 consultation.373 Moreover, according to Judge Marsh, the govern-

ment conceded as much in another case when it acknowledged that states
must comply with section 7 for actions taken under the CRFMP.374 That left
369. See id.
370. See id at 4.
371. That argument especially vexed the tribes because the states had authorized a state commercial
fishery without NMFS issuing a BiOp. The tribes complained to the judge that the states should not be
allowed to prevail under those circumstances because they came to court with unclean hands. The states
acknowledged that their commercial fisheries had violated the ESA and, presumably in response to the
tribes' protests, offered to close their fisheries. See id. at 4.
372. See id.at 5.
373. See id. at 5-6 (citing section 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994), which defines agency action to
include any action "authorized, flmded, or carried out by such agency," and Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d
1441, 1455 (9th Cir. 1988)).
374. See id.at 5 (citing Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 442 (9th Cir. 1996)). In Ramsey, NMFS
completed a BiOp on incidental take of listed salmon as a result of actions taken under the CRFMP. See
Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434,439 (9th Cir. 1996). Following NMFS's issuance ofthe BiOp, the States
of Oregon and Washington promulgated fishing regulations implementing measures in the CRFMP.
Plaintiffs, a collection of aluminum companies, argued that the states were not applicants to the
incidental take permit issued under section 7,and therefore could not promulgate regulations without
first obtaining an incidental take permit under section 10 of the ESA, 16 US.C § 1539. See id.The Ninth
Circuit disagreed, determining that permitted actions under section 7 are not limited to federal agencies,
where the taking by a non-applicant was clearly contemplated by the permit. See id. at 441-42. The
court did not go so far as to say that "every taking that is in compliance with an incidental take statement
is, without more, lawful under the ESA." Id. at 442. Nevertheless, the court's holding allows the states,
at least in the context of the CRFNIP, to benefit from a federal agency incidental take statement without

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:519, 1999

Judge Marsh to decide if he could approve a stipulated agreement without
a BiOp on the proposed action.
The crux of the government's and tribes' argument was that because the
judge authorized similar agreements in the past, he could do so again.375
Once more Judge Marsh disagreed. First, he distinguished the situation
from past agreements where all parties concurred in the stipulation. Second,
he candidly noted that he likely erred in executing the two previous
agreements without requiring a BiOp.37 6 Further, Judge Marsh agreed with
the states that "the unambiguous language of the statute directs that NMFS
must issue a biological opinion responsive to the biological assessment
'
provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service through TAC."377
He
therefore ordered the fishing season closed until NMFS completed a BiOp
in accordance with its obligation under the ESA.
In a move that offset part of the effect of Judge Marsh's order, NMFS
invoked ESA section 7(d) to allow another week of tribal harvest, based on
NMFS's determination that the harvest would not constitute an "irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources" that would foreclose "the
formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative
measures." 378 In the end, however, NMFS had to comply with Judge
Marsh's order and complete a BiOp.
going through the costly and time-consuming section 10 permitting process that requires states and
private parties to produce habitat conservation plans before receiving an incidental take permit. See 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1994) (setting out requirements for issuance of a section 10 incidental take permit).
375. See United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513-MA, at 6-7.
376. See id. at 7 n.4. Interestingly, the Technical Advisory Committee is just that, an advisory body,
with no regulating authority. It is not a federal agency and is not the decisionmaker for purposes of
implementing the CRFMP. The TAC produces a "biological assessment" that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service forwards to NMFS, but no action is possible without the district court's approval. This raises
the question of what is the federal "action" triggering section 7 consultation in this situation. NMFS
argued there was no federal action, even though it had produced BiOps on similar actions in the past.
See Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 442. Despite NMFS's history of producing BiOps under similar circumstances,
its argument had merit, given TAC's nonfederal nature and advisory role. The clearest action authorizing
the incidental take was Judge Marsh's decision to approve the parties' stipulated agreement, without
which no harvest could occur. Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations,
judicial decisions are not considered federal actions. See 40 C.F.I. § 1508.12 (1998). In Ramsey, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed with Judge Marsh's decision that the CRFMP was exempt from NEPA because
it is the product of a judicial consent decree. The court noted that "[e]ven if the creation of the [CRFMP]
were to be classified as an act of the Judiciary because the plan was created through a consent decree,
actions subsequently taken through or under the plan cannot be considered actions by the Judiciary."
Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 443 n.16. Whether that same rationale applies in the ESA context, in which there is
no regulation analogous to NEPA's exemption, is uncertain.
377. United States v. Oregon, No. 68-513-MA, at 8.
378. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (1994). The statute states:
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On September 10, 1998, less than a week after Judge Marsh's order,
NMFS released a BiOp on the effect of the CRFMP on the 1998 fall season
fishery and the 1996-1998 Management Agreement between the United
States v. Oregon parties.379 The BiOp considered a proposal to allow tribal
fishing within the zone above Bonneville Dam; the proposal would permit
an incidental harvest of fifteen percent of wild B-run steelhead and impose
an absolute cap of twenty percent.3 8 Although NMFS lists salmon based on
the ESU concept,381 which is grounded primarily on genetic similarity, it
analyzed the effects of the proposed action using the fishery management
stock concept. The latter is based on the sexual maturity of fish and when
they enter the river, because that is how the data are organized.382
The BiOp determined that the B-run stock of the Snake River Basin ESU
was at the greatest risk from the proposed harvests.383 This ESU is
composed of both A-run and B-run fish. Wild A-run fish are in a state of
decline, while A-run hatchery fish are relatively abundant. Under the
proposed CRFMP, treaty and nontreaty fishers would harvest a total of
9.6% of the ESU's A-run component. In contrast, treaty and nontreaty
fishers would harvest 20% and 1.8% of the B-run, respectively.3 NMFS
found that amount of harvest significant, especially given the B-run's
depressed state. It therefore determined that the proposed CRFMP was
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of B-run steelhead-the run

After initiation of consultation required under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Federal agency
and the permit or license applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate
subsection (a)(2) of the section.
379. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act-Section 7 Consultation:
BiologicalOpinion: Reinitiation ofConsultationto ConsiderImpacts to Listed SteelheadResultingfrom
1998 FallSeason FisheriesConducted Underthe Columbia River FishManagementPlanand 19961998 ManagementAgreement 2 (1998) [hereinafter SteelheadBiOp].
380. See id.
381. See supranotes 43-50 and accompanying text
382. See SteelheadBiOp, supranote 379, at 4. Often multiple stocks coexist within the geographic
range of a particular ESU. For example, the Snake River steelhead ESU has both A-run and B-run stock
components. See id.

383. See id. at 7.In the Upper Columbia River ESU, wild steelhead declined to approximately 900
individuals in 1998. That number fell far short of NMFS's estimated escapement need of 4500
individuals. Moreover, the population continues to decline, with a replacement ratio of 0.3:1, meaning
it takes more than three naturally spawning adults to produce one returning adult fish. See id. at 4. The
Lower Columbia River ESU is comprised of winter and summer runs and therefore is less susceptible
to effects from the fall season harvest. See id.

384. See id. at 10 tbl.1.
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most affected by tribal and recreational fishers. For the other ESUs, NMFS
issued "no jeopardy" determinations.385
Having determined that the CRFMP would jeopardize the Snake River
Basin ESU, NMFS turned to a discussion of the reasonable and prudent
alternatives that would allow the harvest to continue. The greatest thredt to
the ESU, according to NMFS, is the tribal fishery.38 6 The original CRFMP
proposed a tribal steelhead harvest rate of 32%, although over the past ten
years the actual rate had been 24.1 %387 The tribes subsequently agreed to
adjust the rate to 20% during negotiations with NMFS, following comments
from the NMFS Regional Director about limiting the tribal harvest. 388 Thus,
the tribes agreed to an actual reduction of 4.1%. NMFS was prepared to
allow the 20% harvest rate, but Judge Marsh, responding to the states,
forced NMFS to produce the Steelhead BiOp. In the end, however, NMFS
found a reasonable and prudent alternative that, if implemented by the
tribes, would allow the harvest to proceed.
The alternatives NMFS discussed included using eight-inch minimum
mesh size gill nets, adjusting the timing of the harvest to coincide with the
peak of the chinook run, and releasing all unmarked fish. 38 9 NMFS believed
the last of these, releasing unmarked fish, could further reduce the steelhead
harvest rate by as much as five percent without diminishing the tribes' fall
chinook harvest. NMFS concluded that the tribes could reduce incidental
harvest of steelhead to at least fifteen percent, if not ten percent, and that
such a harvest would not jeopardize the listed steelhead. 39" In reaching this
conclusion, NMFS conceded that it did not know the degree to which stocks
must be improved to guarantee the species' survival, and that any harvest
will negatively affect imperiled steelhead. It noted, however, that a harvest
reduced to fifteen percent represented a thirty-eight-percent reduction from
a ten-year average tribal harvest rate. Moreover, NMFS emphasized that
"[w]hether the species survives will depend primarily on actions taken in
other sectors to improve survival. 39' In essence, NMFS suggested that any
reduction in harvest rates is a positive step forward, but that the species'
385. See id. at 11-12.
386. See id. at 13.
387. See id. at 13, 15.
388. See id. at 13; supranote 364 and accompanying text (discussing William Stelle's statement that
precipitated conflict).
389. See SteelheadBiOp,supranote 379, at 13.
390. See id. at 14-15.
391. Id. at 15.
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survival depends on more than minor adjustments to tribal harvest rates.
Following this rationale, NMFS allowed the harvest to continue, deferring
to the tribes' discretion as to how they would achieve the harvest rate
reductions.392
The Ocean BiOp and the Steelhead BiOp highlight how the ESA has
thrust NMFS into the role of salmon protector and allocation broker
between competing interests. In the ocean harvest context, NMFS attempted
to fulfill its salmon protector role by incorporating into its reasonable and
prudent alternatives a requirement that the Pacific Fisheries Management
Council adopt measures in NMFS's proposed recovery plan. Because the
recovery plan is now only proposed, it has no force standing alone. By
finding jeopardy, however, NMFS was able to make the plan operative
through the imposition of reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid
jeopardy.393
The in-river harvest context highlights NMFS's role as a broker. On one
side, the tribes had a strong interest in maintaining their last remaining
commercial fishery. On the other hand, NMFS and the states had an interest
in limiting the tribes' harvest. Those competing interests threatened to
destabilize the system created under the CRFMP by pitting tribal treaty
rights to fish against the ESA's protective measures. When the district court
refused to accept a stipulated agreement and ordered NMFS to produce a
BiOp, NMFS was able to incorporate a negotiated settlement into the BiOp.
As it did in the ocean context, NMFS made a jeopardy determination and
then used reasonable and prudent alternatives as a tool to accomplish a
particular end. One unresolved question is whether NMFS can limit the
tribes' harvest while at the same time allowing high mortalities caused by
hydroelectric operations, and still fulfill its federal trust obligation to the
tribes."9 A recent Secretarial Order on the relationship between the trust
obligation and the ESA suggests that NMFS cannot. 95
392 See id.at 14.
393. When jeopardy is avoided through the imposition of reasonable and prudent alternatives
specified by a consulting agency, the ESA makes implementation of those measures mandatory. See 16

U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(B)(iii) (1994).
394. See Wood, supranote 327, at 742-49,794-99.
395. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior& U.S. Dep't of Commerce, SecretarialOrderon American Indian
TribalRights, Federal-TribalTrust Responsibilities,and the EndangeredSpecies Act at princ. 3 (C)(iii)
(1997), reprintedin 72 Wash. L Rev. 1089, 1095-96 (1997) (requiring restrictions on tribal incidental
takes to be "least restrictive alternative" available to achieve conservation purpose). The background
and significance of the Secretarial Order is discussed in Charles F. Wilkinson, The Role ofBioteralism
in Fulfillingthe Federal-TribalRelationship: The TribalRights-EndangeredSpecies SecretarialOrder,

72 Wash. L. Rev. 1063 (1997).
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HabitatBiOps

Protecting salmon habitat has been a neglected issue of salmon
restoration efforts, overshadowed by the perceived need to obtain
immediate changes in hydroelectric and hatchery practices. Habitat
protection cannot promise short-term improvements in run sizes. In fact, it
is hardly clear what the loss of particular spawning and rearing habitat may
mean in terms of run size declines. The uncertainties in correlating habitat
protection to run sizes have made habitat BiOps an overlooked area of
salmon restoration efforts.
Another reason for the relative obscurity of habitat BiOps is that NMFS
has taken steps to reduce their prominence. In August 1995, NMFS signed
an interagency memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the U.S. Forest
Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and FWS, establishing an
interagency process to "streamline" project-specific consultations under
section 7.396 This MOA was revised by the agencies in February 1997 and
is currently employed throughout Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.39 7 Under
the MOA, which was NMFS's response to congressional concerns that
NMFS consultation was impeding timber sales, the agencies establish "level
one teams."'3 98 These teams work cooperatively to improve action agencies'
biological assessments by reaching consensus on whether there is adequate
data on the listed species and what the effects of the proposed action will be
on the species.399 The upshot is that about three-quarters of consultations
under the MOA now culminate in a biological assessment and a NMFS
concurrence with an action agency finding that its proposed action is not
likely to adversely affect listed salmon or their critical habitat. 40 This takes
place without a BiOp, in effect substituting informal consultation for formal
40
consultation procedures and cutting the typical consultation time in half.

396. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion on Land andResources Management
PlansforNational Forestsand Bureau ofLand Management Resource Areas in the Upper Columbia
River Basin and Snake River Basin Evolutionarily Significant Units 3-4 (1998) [hereinafter Upper
ColumbiaBiOp] (discussing 1995 MOA).
397. See id. at 4; U.S. Dep't of Agric. etal., StreamliningConsultationProcedures Under Section
7ofthe EndangeredSpecies Act-February1997 ProcedureGuidance (1997).
398. Telephone conversation between Greg Corbin and Steve Morris, Head of NMFS's Habitat
Section in the Office of Protected Resources, in Portland, Or. (Feb. 4, 1999).
399. See id.
400. For a discussion of biological opinions within "formal" consultation procedures, see 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(h) (1998).
401. Telephone conversation between Greg Corbin and Steve Morris, supra note 398.
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1.

Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas: RequiringESA Consultationfor
LandManagementPlans

After the listing of Snake River chinook as threatened in April 1992,402
the ESA required federal land managers like the U.S. Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management to evaluate whether a host of their land
management activities-principally timber, grazing, and road projectsmight affect the listed salmon. Although the land managers agreed to
evaluate ongoing and proposed activities through section 7 consultation,
they did not agree to subject their land management plans, many of which
had only recently been approved, to section 7 consultation. They contended
that the ESA did not apply to plans approved before the listing of a species
because land management plans were not "ongoing" activities subject to the
ESA, but merely "programmatic" documents." 3
A coalition of environmental groups, led by Pacific Rivers Council, sued
to challenge the Forest Service's interpretation as it applied to the Umatilla
and Wallowa-Whitman National Forests in eastern Oregon and Washington.
The district court agreed that 'the ESA contained no exemption from
consultation of previously approved land management plans. 4°4 However,
although the court enjoined the Forest Service from conducting any new
timber sales, issuing grazing permits, or building roads pending compliance
with section 7, the court refused to enjoin any ongoing or announced
projects.4°5
Both the Forest Service and the environmentalists appealed, and the
Ninth Circuit upheld the environmentalists' position in a July 1994
decision. The court ruled that land management plans, which it described
as "comprehensive management plans governing a multitude of individual
projects," had "an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption" and
therefore represented ongoing actions subject to section 7.406 The court
noted that one of the forest plans under review allocated 60,000 acres of
public lands surrounding spawning grounds for Snake River chinook by
establishing guidelines for logging, grazing, and road-building activities;
setting allowable sale quantities of timber; and fixing schedules for forage,

402. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
403. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1994).

404. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Robertson, 854 F. Supp. 713, 722-23 (D. Or. 1993).
405. See id at 724-25.
406. Thomas, 30 F.3d at 1053.
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road-building, and other economic activities." Given their importance "in
establishing resource and land use policies for the forests," the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the ESA required previously approved plans to undergo
consultation. 8 The court also reversed the district court's ruling that timber
sales that had undergone consultation could continue, enjoining the timber
harvests until the forest plans governing the sales had undergone
consultation.' This decision was subsequently applied to enjoin ongoing
timber sales in six national forests in Idaho.41 °
The PacificRivers Council decisions brought section 7 consultation to
public land management plans throughout the portion of the Columbia
Basin still accessible to salmon.41' Land managers could no longer authorize

individual activities governed by a land management plan without
considering the plan's effect on listed salmon and their habitat.412 The

407. See id at 1055.
408. Id, at 1056 (finding that forest plans are ongoing actions subject to consultation requirements
under section 7(a)(2) of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
409. See id. at 1056-57 (finding that timber sales areperse irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources under § 7(d) of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d), and cannot proceed until consultation on
relevant forest plan is complete). The district court subsequently applied the injunction to road
construction and maintenance activities, but allowed grazing and removal of downed timber to continue
unless the Forest Service had determined that they would be "likely to adversely affect" listed salmon.
Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, Civ. No. 92-1322-MA, 1994 WL 908600, at *5-6 (D. Or. Oct 20,1994).
410. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 873 F. Supp. 365, 372 (D. Idaho 1995). This injunction
was later dissolved after the consultation process was completed. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas,
897 F. Supp. 454,455 (D. Idaho 1995).
411. It may be questioned whether the Pacific Rivers Councilresult could be achieved in the wake
of Ohio ForestryAss'n v. Sierra Club, where the Court unanimously ruled that challenges to Forest
Service land management plans were not ripe unless the plan authorized site-specific activities. 118 S.
Ct. 1665, 1672 (1998). However, the Ohio ForestryCourt was careful to note that challenges to the
NEPA documentation accompanying the plan approval were ripe because a failure to comply with
NEPA procedure "can never get riper" than when the failure takes place. Id Similarly, failure to engage
in section 7 consultation on land management plans would seem to be ripe when the procedural failure
takes place.
412. The initial response to section 7 consultation was the establishment of interim aquatic habitat
protections for both salmon and non-salmonid species. See U.S. Dep't of Agric. et al., Environmental
Assessmentfor the Implementation ofInterim StrategiesforManagingAnadromous Fish-Producing
Watershedsin EasternOregon and Washington, Idaho, andPortionsof California 12 (1994) (amending
PACFISH, 15 national forest plans and seven BLM land management plans within range of listed
salmon species); Forest Serv.,U.S. Dep't of Agric., Inland Native Fish Strategy Environmental
Assessment 1 (1995) (amending 22 national forest plans to provide interim riparian protection for nonanadromous fish species). See generally Murray D. Feldman, Snake River Salmon and the National
Forests: The StruggleforHabitatConservation,Resource Development, and Ecosystem Management
in the Pacific Northwest, 3 Hastings West-Northwest J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 273, 282-85 (1996). The
Upper Columbia BiOp reviewed PACFISH protection and found implementation wanting, especially
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principle of requiring plan consultation is especially important given
NMFS's apparent policy of using the consultation process to enforce
provisions in pre-existing area-wide plans.4 13 This obligation to consider
salmon habitat in public land decisionmaking encouraged new approaches
to land management For example, the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem
Management offers the promise of revolutionizing the concept of multiple
use in public land management, although it faces an uncertain political
414
future.
2.

Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's Ass'ns v. National Marine
Fisheries Service: Failingto Implement Ecosystem Management

Land management changes induced by aquatic protection concerns will
occur only if the aquatic protections are enforced. The initial efforts were
hardly encouraging, as reflected in the events leading to the district court's
decision in Pacific Coast Federationof Fisherman'sAss'ns v. National
MarineFisheriesService.415 The case involved the intersection of section
7 and another broad ecosystem management program, the Northwest Forest

concerning grazing standards and monitoring, road standards, and restoration of fish habitat. See Upper
Columbia BiOp, supra note 396, at 26-30,34-36.
413. See infra notes 424-25, 458-61, and accompanying text
414. See Blumm, Amphibious Salmon, supranote 29, at 672-74. In May 1997, the Forest Service and
the Bureau of Land Management released two draft environmental impact statements (EISs) on the
Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project These EISs would amend national forest and BLM
land management plans east of the Cascade Mountains, in eastern Oregon and Washington, all of Idaho,
western Montana, and small portions of Utah and Nevada. See Forest Serv., US. Dep't of Agric. &
Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Columbia Ecosystem Management
Project:EastsideDraft EIS (1997) [hereinafterEasiside DraftEIS]; Forest Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.
& Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior Upper Columbia River Basin: Draft
EnvironmentalImpactStatement (1997) [hereinafter Upper ColumbiaDraftEIS]. Perhaps because the
draft gISs devoted substantial attention to aquatic ecosystems, see EastsideDraft EI,supra,c. 2 at
116-66,227-29; ch. 3 at 118-57,199-200; ch. 4 at 132-55; Upper ColumbiaDraftEIS, supra,ch. 2
at 103-24, ch. 4 at 132-43, they proved to be extremely controversial politically, and the Republican
Congress attempted to de-fund the project several times.
Also, in June 1998, NMFS released a revised BiOp on 18 Forest Service and BLM land management
plans within the range of listed salmon and steelhead species, due in part to five steelhead listings in
August 1997. See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1997); see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. The
BiOp concluded that the plans would not jeopardize the listed species. NMFS based this finding largely
on a series of measures intended to reduce the adverse effects of implementation of land management
plans on the listed species. The land managers had agreed to these measures in their biological
assessment as a result of "streamlining" consultation. See supranotes 396-401 and accompanying text;
see also Upper Columbia BiOp, supra note 396, at 7-8, 75-80.
415. No. C97-775R (W.D. Wash. May 29, 1998).
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Plan, created as a response to the listings of the northern spotted owl.4 16 In
1994, a federal district court upheld the Northwest Forest Plan, which
includes lands both within and outside the Columbia Basin, although the
court cautioned that the plan's legality rested largely on its
implementation.4 7
In August 1996, a little over two years after the plan's approval, NMFS
listed as endangered the Umpqua River cutthroat trout, a species outside the
Columbia Basin, citing habitat degradation from logging and recreational
fishing as the principal threats to the species' existence.4" 8 The listing
prompted NMFS to issue a BiOp on the effect of the Northwest Forest Plan,
and activities authorized by it, on the listed cutthroat and several other
species proposed for listing.4" 9 The BiOp concluded that the aquatic
conservation strategy promised by the forest plan would achieve its
preservation and restoration objectives, but the BiOp did not specifically
consider the plummeting populations of cutthroat and the poor habitat
conditions in the Umpqua Basin. 420 The BiOp was unable to complete
consultation on specific habitat-degrading activities like clearcutting and
road building, but it did establish a matrix and checklist to help a team of
fishery biologists determine whether additional BiOps would be required
to satisfy the ESA. 42' Although the biologists recommended eliminating
clearcuts, the Forest Service and BLM did not eliminate them (although
they did eliminate new road construction). In addition, NMFS approved
416. See Forest Serv., U.S. Dep't ofAgric. & Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Record ofDecisionfor Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning
Documents Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl and Standards and Guidelines for
Management ofHabitatforLate-Successionaland Old-Growth ForestRelated Species Within the Range
ofthe Northern Spotted Owl (1994). For a critical review of the Northwest Forest Plan, see Henry B.
Lacey, New Approach or Business as Usual: Protectionof Aquatic Ecosystems Under the Clinton
Administration'sWestside ForestsPlan, 10 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 309 (1995).
417. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1322, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd.,
80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996); see also id. at 1300 (noting that "any more logging sales than the plan
contemplates would probably violate the laws"). NMFS made a one-paragraph determination that the
Northwest Forest Plan would not jeopardize listed salmon species. See Letter of J. Gary Smith, Acting
NMFS Regional Director, to Robert Jacobs, Interagency SEIS Team (Jan. 13, 1994), reprintedin Forest
Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., 2 FinalSupplemental EnvironmentalImpact Statement on Management of
Habitatfor Late-Successional and Old-Growth Species Within the Range ofthe Northern Spotted Owl,
at app. G (1994).
418. See 61 Fed. Reg. 41,514,41,517-20 (1996) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1998)).
419. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion and Conference Opinion on
Implementation ofLand and Resource ManagementPlans (USFS) and Resource ManagementPlans
(1997) [hereinafter Land PlanBiOp].
420. See Patti Goldman, EndangeredSpecies Act Duties, Big River News, Spring 1998, at 1, 3.
421. See LandPlan BiOp, supranote 419, at 3, 49.
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dozens of timber sales in its BiOps issued in May to July 1997, even though
there was no systematic analysis of the cumulative impacts of continuing
clearcuts in already-degraded watersheds. 4'
A coalition of fishing and environmental organizations challenged the
NMFS May-June 1997 BiOp, and a district court enjoined the timber sales,
although it did uphold the consultation on the Northwest Forest Plan
itself.4" The case indicates that the plan consultation insisted upon by the
PacificRivers Council court may not receive close judicial scrutiny, due to
the level of generality employed in land management plans. Courts will not,
however, allow specific projects to proceed on the basis of NMFS's
assumptions that the protections promised in the plans will be implemented.
Instead, NMFS must demonstrate at the project stage that the activity will
comply with the aquatic protection strategy of the Northwest Forest Plan.424
If the PCFFA court's approach is widely adopted by other courts, the
section 7 process could become a vehicle to ensure that the broad promises
made in ecosystem management plans are in fact carried out on the ground.
Ironically, the impetus for the plans themselves was a desire to provide
some balance to landS management decisions that seemed to be driven by
42
ESA requirements.
If, however, the section 7 process is to become a mechanism to achieve
ecosystem management, the courts will apparently have to continue to
oversee NMFS. In December 1998, NMFS employed "streamlining" to
approve nine of the BLM timber sales enjoined by the PCFFA court, with
virtually no changes from the proposals contained in BLM's biological
assessments.426 NMFS concurred in the timber harvests despite
acknowledging that the sale areas "are dominated by conditions rated
largely as 'not properly functioning' or 'at risk'," and that the
environmental baseline "does not currently meet all of the biological
requirements for the survival and recovery of the listed species within the
422. See Goldman, supranote 420, at 3.
423. See Pacific CoastFed'n ofFisherman'sAss'ns v. NationalMarine FisheriesServ., No. C97775R (W.D. Wash. May 29, 1998), at 27-31 (site-specific project consultation); id. at 20-24 (plan
consultation).
424. See id. at 30.
425. See Blumm, Amphibious Salmon, supra note 29, at 669 (discussing President Clinton's
motivations in spearheading development of Northwest Forest Plan).
426. See Letter from William Stelle, Jr., NMFS Regional Administrator, to Cary Osterhaus, District
Manager of Roseburg Bureau of Land Management 10-14 (Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Umpqua
Consultation Letter] (regarding section 7 consultation on proposed actions affecting Umpqua River
cutthroat trout and Oregon Coastal coho salmon).
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action area."4 27 NMFS reasoned that there would be no jeopardy to species,
because the sales would involve only "minor short-term adverse impacts"
like increased sediment loadings, due to mitigation measures such as those
contained in the Northwest Forest Plan.428 NMFS reached this conclusion
even though some of the sales were within riparian reserves established by
the plan, and without considering separately the effect of the sales on
designated critical habitat.4 29 NMFS also seems to have adopted a narrow
interpretation of the "action area" in which to assess the cumulative impacts
of activities,430 choosing to evaluate only effects on the watersheds
immediately affected by the activity rather than effects on the life cycle of
the listed species. It seems likely that a court will be asked to review
NMFS's rubber-stamping of BLM's Umpqua Basin timber sales.43' NMFS
has suggested, however, that it may employ its ESU concept to delist the
Umpqua cutthroat by combining that population with cutthroat populations
in southwestern Washington, which may prompt more litigation.432
3.

The InlandLand BiOp: Taking Seriously Cumulative Impacts and
the EnvironmentalBaseline

Standing in sharp contrast to the Umpqua timber sales BiOps is the
Inland Land BiOp. There, NMFS took a contextual approach in concluding
that a proposed withdrawal of Columbia River water would jeopardize
listed salmon, due largely to the biologically unsatisfactory nature of the
Columbia River's current environment. NMFS determined that the
proposed diversion, in the context of existing water withdrawals and likely
future withdrawals, would make an already inadequate streamflow regime
worse.

43 3

427. Id. at 9.
428. Id. at 21-22.
429. See id. at 22-23. NMFS assumed that because it concluded that there would be no jeopardy to
the species, the statute's command that there be no adverse effect on critical habitat, 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2) (1994), was automatically satisfied. See Umpqua Consultation Letter, supra note 426, at 22.
NMFS also assumed that the cumulative effects of nonfederal activities within the project area would
remain the same as in recent years. See id. at 21.
430. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02, 402.14 (1998).
431. See Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman's Ass'ns v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. C9967R (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 1999) (order granting preliminary injunction).
432. See Umpqua Cutthroat To Be Combined with Larger ESU, Removed from List, Endangered
Species & Wetlands Rep., Feb. 1999, at 6. On the ESU concept, see supra notes 43-50.
433. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion on InlandLand, Inc., Columbia River
iii (1997) [hereinafter InlandLand BiOp].
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The Inland Land proposal was to build a pumping facility capable of
withdrawing up to 303 cubic feet per second from John Day reservoir in the

Columbia River, to irrigate land near Boardman, Oregon.434 Because the
proposal concerned a project in a navigable waterway, the project needed
a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,435 which triggered ESA

consultation requirements.436 As a result, the Corps wrote a biological
assessment concluding that the proposed action would have no adverse
effect on listed salmon, but NMFS determined that the assessment was

inadequate.437 The Corps then revised its assessment, again concluding that
the proposal would produce no adverse effects because the pumping

operation's effect on salmon migration would be "nearly immeasurable."4 8
NMFS emphatically disagreed, concluding in its BiOp that the facility
would produce jeopardy to the listed salmon.439
NMFS's reasoning in its Inland Land BiOp was grounded largely on the
biologically unsatisfactory state of Columbia and Snake River flows and the
role of the proposed project-in concert with existing and reasonably
foreseeable future withdrawals-in making the situation worse. NMFS

estimated that some thirty million acre-feet of water is now withdrawn for
irrigation from Columbia Basin streams each year, which amounts to about
forty percent of the average annual natural river flow at McNary Dam in

low flow years."0 Moreover, NMFS determined that irrigation withdrawals
were "the principal reason" that the flow objectives established in its 1995

BiOp on hydroelectric operations went unmet." In fact, NMFS asserted
434. See id at2.
435. Under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994), the Corps issues permits
for fill activities in navigable waters, which the statute defines as "waters of the United States." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994). Under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. §§ 401415, 502, 687 (1994), the Corps issues permits for construction work in navigable waters.
436. Under section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, all federal agencies must ensure that any action "authorized,
funded, or carried out" by the agency is not likely to produce jeopardy to listed species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (1994). The implementing regulations state that section 7 procedures apply to any
discretionary federal agency action. See 50 C.F.R § 402.02 (1998).
437. See InlandLandBiOp, supra note 433, at 2. The ESA requires action agencies like the Corps
to prepare a biological assessment on major construction activities and activities with similar physical
effects, evaluating the proposed project's effects on listed species and its habitat. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(c) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. An action agency's determination that the proposal will not likely
have adverse effects on listed species must have the written concurrence of the consulting agency, in this
case NMFS. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1998).
438. Inland LandBiOp, supra note 433, at 2, 10.
439. See id. at 15.
440. See idat8.
441. On the flow objectives, see supranotes 244, 249-50, and accompanying text.
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that "[b]ut for irrigation withdrawals, summer flow objectives [for the
Snake River at Lower Granite Dam] would be met every year... whereas
with withdrawals, summer flow objectives are met less than fifteen percent
of the time."" 2 The situation was similar on the lower Columbia, where
summer flow objectives would be met seventy-four percent of the time
without irrigation withdrawals, but are met only twenty-six percent of the
time with the withdrawals." 3
Because NMFS "concluded that flow reductions in the Snake and
Columbia Rivers are a cause of decline of listed Snake River salmon," the
agency determined that the existing environmental baseline was inadequate
to meet the listed species' biological requirements. If the agency allowed
the proposed withdrawal to proceed, it might have to allow similar future
proposals to proceed as well.4 " Because many water withdrawals are not
subject to NMFS scrutiny under ESA consultation requirements, 445 NMFS
decided that the proposal, in combination with the cumulative impacts
produced by existing and likely future irrigation withdrawals, would
produce species jeopardy." 6 As a result, NMFS prepared a "reasonable and
prudent alternative" to the proposal that would condition the project on "no
net loss" of streamflows during the juvenile salmon migration season,
installation of a suitable streamfiow measuring device, and pumping
restrictions designed to ensure that NMFS's flow objectives are likely to be
met on a weekly basis." 7 These conditions essentially made the project
infeasible from the applicant's perspective.
The Inland Land BiOp has produced allegations that the ESA is
unlawfully abrogating state water rights," because Inland Land had a
442. Inland Land BiOp, supra note 433.
443. See id.
at 10. Spring flow objectives were similarly affected by irrigation withdrawals: with the
withdrawals, they are met at Lower Granite Dam 64% of the time; without irrigation withdrawals, they
would be met 94% of the time. At McNary, with the withdrawals the flow objectives are met 72% of the
time; without them, the objectives would be met 92% of the time. See id. at 9-10.
444. See id. at 12-13.
445. NMFS noted that groundwater withdrawals and intake structures in non-navigable waterways
do not require Corps permits, and therefore presumably would not be subject to ESA consultation
requirements. See id.
at 14. These activities could still violate the ESA's prohibition on "taking" listed
species, see supranotes 15-16 and accompanying text, but atake would have to be proven, which would
likely require a court trial. However, water diversions with federal involvement, like Bureau of
Reclamation water deliveries, would require consultation.
446. See Inland Land BiOp,supra note 433, at 15.
447. Seeid. at 15-16.
448. See Bill Crampton, NMFS Takes Heatover Water Policies, 12 Columbia Basin Bull. 2 (Sept.
4, 1998) <http://www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull_12.htm> (discussing charges made by state legislators,
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pending water right for the pumping facility, which had been extended
repeatedly by the State of Oregon," 9 and is therefore exempt from the
state's ban on diversions from the Columbia River during the salmon
migration season." NMFS responded that its position is usually to "meet
ESA water needs consistent with state law," but that courts have required
state water right holders to act consistent with ESA requirements. 45' The
cases that have considered the intersection between ESA requirements and
state water rights have ruled that (1) the Corps of Engineers could require

a federal permit from a Colorado water right holder because of ESA
concerns in Nebraska;4 2 (2) a California water right holder had to exercise
his right in a manner that did not violate ESA taking prohibitions;4 3 and (3)
Texas groundwater pumpers had to observe ESA-imposed restrictions to
preserve habitat in aft aquifer.45 4 NMFS's restrictions on the Oregon water
right holder in the Inland Land case would hardly seem to be different.4 5
Even so, while taking action in the Inland Land case, NMFS has acquiesced
in continued water deliveries to irrigators under Bureau of Reclamation
contracts, despite Ninth Circuit rulings that existing water contracts are
not
4 6
immune from regulatory requirements, including ESA requirements.
irrigators, and members of Congress at hearing of House Resources Committee held in Pasco,
Washington, on September 2, 1998).
449. See InlandLand BiOp, supranote 433, at 13; Jeff Mapes, John Day Senator'sSurprisingClout
Belies Relative Inexperience, Oregonian, Feb. 7, 1999, at CI (describing political pressure from Oregon
legislature to grant additional water-right extension); see also JeffMapes & Bill Monroe, SquirrelGives
Teeth to Dispute About FarmingEastern Oregon Tract, Oregonian, Feb. 20, 1999, at BI (explaining
environmentalists' attempt to derail Inland Land project by petitioning Oregon Fish and Wildlife
Commission to list Washington ground squirrel as endangered under state Endangered Species Act).
450. See Or. Admin. R. 690-33-100 to -140 (1998); Joy Ellis, Draflingfrom an OverdrawnAccount:
Continuing Water Diversionsfrom the Mainstem Columbia and Snake Rivers, 26 Envtl. L.299, 311-16
(1996).
451. Letter from William Stelle, Jr., NMFS Regional Administrator, to Congressman Don Young,
Chairman of the House Resources Committee (Oct. 21, 1998).
452. See Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) (requiring individual
section 404 permit under Clean Water Act due to potential effects on listed whooping cranes).
453. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
454. See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997) (concerning the Edwards
Aquifer).
455. In fact, the Inland Land case would seem to be an easier one than Glenn-Colusa or the Edwards
Aquifer case, supranotes 453-54 and accompanying text. Unlike those cases, Inland Land was a section
7 case, requiring federal avoidance ofjeopardy, rather than proving a section 9 "take."
456. See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 686 (9th Cir. 1995); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998), discussedinfra note 489; see also Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water Rights, in Water Law: Trends, Policies, and Practice 43, 48
(Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds., 1995).
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The contrast between NMFS's position in the Umpqua timber sale BiOps
and the Inland Land BiOp is remarkable. In the former, NMFS approved
new timber sales in an area that already had biologically unsatisfactory
habitat due to past timber practices; in the latter, NMFS refused to allow a
water withdrawal that the Corps concluded would have a "nearly
immeasurable" effect because of concerns that the proposal would
exacerbate the biologically unsatisfactory state of river flows.4 7 The
difference may be because in the Umpqua BiOp, NMFS could point to the
fact that the sales were consistent with the requirements of the Northwest
Forest Plan,458 an ecosystem management plan that promises both
sustainable species and timber harvests.459 However, in the Inland Land
BiOp, the only relevant ecosystem plan was NMFS's own BiOp on
hydropower operations, which had called for specific river flows that had
not been met.4" Because the ecosystem management plan for the river
contained specifics that the forest plan did not, NMFS's decisionmaking on
the individual projects at issue was materially different.46 '
IV. THE LESSONS
The Columbia Basin is now awash with ESA listings of salmonids. No
fewer than twelve Columbia Basin salmonid species are currently under
ESA protection. When the decade dawned, there were no salmonid listings
at all. Within a seven-year period, the ESA has assumed a dominant role in
salmon law and policy in the basin. This Part suggests some lessons
emerging from this experience with the ESA.
A.

The Importance of Citizen Petitions

The role of citizen petitions in bringing ESA protections to Columbia
Basin salmon is sometimes overlooked. The initial listings were the result

457. See supranotes 438-47 and accompanying text.
458. See Umpqua Consultation Letter, supra note 426, at 21 (noting that the sales will follow relevant
standards and guidelines of the Northwest Forest Plan and will meet the plan's aquatic conservation
strategy's objectives at the watershed scale and in the long run).
459. Some commentators are skeptical, however. See, e.g., Brent Foster, The Failureof Watershed
Analysis Under the Northwest ForestPlan: A Case Study of the Gifford Pinchot NationalForest, 5
Hastings West-Northwest J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 337 (1999); Lacey, supra note 416.
460. See supranotes 244,249,440-43, and accompanying text.
461. See Houck, supra note 107, at 974-78.
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of citizen petitions,4 62 just as was the case with the northern spotted owl
listings that revolutionized timber management in the Pacific Northwest 463
In effect, the petitioning process is a mechanism that triggers the ESA's
science-based decisionmaking, because once NMFS determines that there
is credible science supporting the petition, the agency must make listing
decisions on biological, not economic, grounds. 4 Without this "actionforcing" provision of the ESA, it is quite doubtful that the federal
government would have decided to list any salmonids, given the widespread
changes in land and water use decisionmaking that were sure to result.
B.

The Role ofEvolutionarilySignificant Units

One innovation that the salmon petitions prompted was NMFS's concept
of an "evolutionarily significant unit" (ESU) as the means of defining which
population segments were worthy of ESA protection.' 5 The ESU concept
seemed to emphasize reproductive and genetic isolation to the exclusion of
other ESA policies such as protecting ecosystem health, conserving
endangered domestic populations even though a species is relatively
abundant elsewhere in the world, and providing management flexibility in
the face of scientific uncertainty. 4 " One result of this emphasis was to
enable NMFS to reject listings of certain salmonids, like it initially did in
the case of Columbia River coho. 4 7 Another was to produce a division
between NMFS and its sister agency, FWS, which did not adopt the ESU
concept. Instead, it continued to account for geographical distribution and

462. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribe filed the first petition to list Snake River sockeye in March 1990.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (1990). Two months later, in May 1990, a coalition of environmental groups,
including Oregon Trout, Oregon Natural Resources Council, Northwest Environmental Defense Center,
American Rivers, and the Idaho and Oregon chapters of the American Fisheries Society, filed a petition
to list Snake River chinook. See 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990).
463. Green World, a nonprofit group in Cambridge, Massachusetts, petitioned the FWS to list the
northern spotted owl on January 20, 1987. This was followed by a second petition on August 4, 1987,
from the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. See 52 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (1987). FWS denied the petition and

environmentalists promptly filed suit. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D.
Wash. 1988); Victoria M. Sher, Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal
Courts, 14 Pub. Land L. Rev. 41,46-47 (1993) (describing initial conflict over listing owl).
464. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994). For a discussion of the listing process, see Rohlf, supra
note 15, at 42-47.
465. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (1991).
466. See Rohlf supranote 42, at 636-51.
467. See supra note 187.
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political boundaries, in addition to genetic isolation, when making listing
decisions.468
C.

The Role of State ConservationPlans in the Listing Process

One legacy of the court decisions on salmon listings is that state
conservation plans will not substitute for species listings unless they are
enforceable. NMFS and FWS remain quite interested in encouraging states
to adopt species conservation plans and are in fact preparing a policy to
guide states in developing such plans. 469 The federal district court of
Oregon, however, has made it quite clear that states cannot base
conservation plans on promises of future regulation and voluntary
measures.47 According to that court, the ESA demands that state plans
qualify as "existing
regulatory measures," meaning "existing enforceable
471
measures."
This precedent may be tested soon in the case of Atlantic salmon. 472 Even
if state plans cannot generally substitute for listings, they may play a role
in the formulation of habitat conservation plans necessary for incidental
take permits or section 4(d) rules authorizing takes of threatened species.473
The appropriate role of state plans in the implementation of the ESA, first
raised in the context of Oregon's coho plan, has yet to be definitively
determined.
D.

The EnlargedScope of Salmon-DamagingActivities Subject to
Scrutiny

Listing of Columbia Basin salmonids under the ESA had one undeniable
effect: it subjected many activities to systematic biological scrutiny for the
first time. Prior to the first listings in 1992,"' only hydroelectric activities

468. See Rohlf, supra note 42, at 657-62.
469. See Salmon FightShifts, supranote 210, at 2.
470. See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
471. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1153-55 (D. Or. 1998)
(interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (1994)).
472. Maine's conservation plan is allegedly deficient, prompting a lawsuit from environmentalists.
See Salmon Fight Shifts, supra note 210, at 1 (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 99-206
(D.D.C. filed 1999)).
473. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)(1994) (authorizing rules that are "necessary and advisable" to provide
for conservation of threatened species); § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994) (authorizing incidental take permits).
474. See supra notes 57, 63, and accompanying text.
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were scrutinized closely for their adverse affects on salmon under the
provisions of the Northwest Power Act.475 Yet, after a decade of efforts
under that statute, touted as the most ambitious biological restoration
program in the world 476 the results were disappointing, and the ESA listings
ensued.477 The listings induced a more comprehensive approach to salmon
restoration than merely changing hydroelectric operations, expanding the
focus of inquiry to hatchery, harvest, and habitat activities that were beyond
the scope of the Northwest Power Act.478 The ESA therefore offered the
prospect of designing a restoration program that would address all major
sources of salmon mortality, including public land and water use decisionmaking, not just hydropower.479
Perhaps even more significant is that,given the pervasiveness of federal
activities in the Columbia Basin, ESA consultation offers the prospect of
altering myriad activities threatening listed salmon and their habitat. From
hydroelectric operations to hatchery funding to harvest management to land
planning, federal involvement in actions adversely affecting Columbia
Basin salmon makes the section 7 process the key decisionmaking
mechanism in salmon restoration efforts.
E.

Some Anomalous Exceptions to the EnlargedMandate: FERCLicensed Dam Operationsand Bureau ofReclamation Water
Deliveries

Despite the broad scope of activities now subject to section 7
consultation, not every federal activity having significant adverse effects on
listed salmon has or is undergoing biological consultation. Two glaring
exceptions are dam operations licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and Bureau of Reclamation water management
activities.

475. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (1994).
476. See Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supra note 4, at 661 (citing Northwest Power Planning
Council, 1987 Columbia Basin Fishand Wildlife Program5 (1987)).
477. See generallyBlumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supranote 4.
478. See Blumm, Amphibious Salmon, supranote 29, at 662-63.
479. However, it bears noting that about 80% of salmon mortalities in the Columbia Basin are due
to hydropower. See 1995 BiOp, supranote 249, at 4. In February 1999, NMFS announced that it would
produce a BiOp addressing all forms of salmon mortality, covering hydroelectric operations, hatchery
and harvest management, and habitat protection. See Barry Espenson, FederalAgenciesPoint Toward
New BiOp,29 Columbia Basin Bull. 1 (Feb. 26, 1999) <http.//www.nwpp.org/bullein/bull_33.htm#l>.
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There is no question that a decision by FERC to relicense a dam is a
federal action triggering section 7 consultation. 4 ° Thus far, however,

operation of federally licensed dams has managed to escape consultation,
largely on the basis of two curious judicial interpretations of the Federal
Power Act's provision authorizing judicial review of FERC actions. First,

a district court ruled that environmental plaintiffs could not challenge
FERC's failure to consult on the ongoing effects of a licensed dam because
section 3 13 of the Federal Power Act reserved exclusive jurisdiction over
FERC decisionmaking to the circuit courts of appeal.4 8' Second, the Ninth
Circuit refused to allow another group of environmentalists to challenge
FERC's failure to consult on ongoing license operations because it
construed section 3 13 to require a FERC order to trigger judicial review,
and FERC refused to act on the environmentalists' request.482 The latter
result seems inconsistent with a D.C. Circuit decision ruling that FERC
could not, consistent with the Federal Power Act, fail to consider protective
fish and wildlife conditions in annual operating licenses while a relicensing
proceeding was underway.4" 3 If FERC may exempt itself from ESA

procedures by inaction, it will effectively enable federally licensed dams to
escape the consultation requirements imposed on federally owned dams.4 4

The Bureau of Reclamation is another agency that has thus far managed
to escape ESA consultation. The Bureau operates a series of dams in Idaho,
480. Section 7(a)(2) makes consultation applicable to "any action authorized, funded, or carried out"
by a federal agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1984). FERC-licensed dams in the Columbia Basin include
five mainstem dams on the Columbia, licensed to Washington public utility districts, and the three-dam
Hells Canyon Complex on the mainstem Snake, licensed to Idaho Power Company. See Blumm,
Hydropower vs. Salmon, supra note 60, at 23 8-43.
481. See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F. Supp. 116 (D. Ariz. 1997).
482. See American Rivers v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1998).
483. See Platte River Whooping Crane v. FERC, 876 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The Fish and
Wildlife Service had requested consultation under the ESA. See id. at 116-17. A subsequent decision
clarified that FERC's authority to impose new protective conditions in ongoing licenses was limited to
situations in which it had reserved the authority to change conditions in the original license. See Platte
River Whooping Crane v. FERC, 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Such reserved authority exists
concerning the Columbia Basin projects.
484. Nonfederal dams are still subject to consultation at relicensing, and may violate the section 9
prohibition against taking listed species, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994), but proving that a taking has
occurred may require a trial. To comply with section 9, two of the three public utility districts (PUDs)
with dams on the mainstem Columbia have been drafting a habitat conservation plan (HCP). The "no
surprises" policy might ensure that the PUDs would not have to change operations not called for in the
HCP (or would be compensated for any changes) for 50 years. See supra note 16. Thus, the "no
surprises" policy may encourage nonfederal entities to prepare HCPs to obtain section 10 permits to
authorize takes, rather than rely on "incidental take statements" in BiOps, because they may be able to
obtain insulation from operational changes for a period of time that is longer than their license terms.
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Oregon, and Wyoming, collectively storing 6.5 million acre-feet of water.485
Neither the Bureau's operation of these dams nor its water deliveries to

irrigators, some of which are not authorized to receive such federally stored
water, has ever been subject to comprehensive analysis in a BiOp.48 6 Yet the
Bureau's water management activities have significant effects on Snake
River flows, thereby adversely affecting listed salmon.487 Moreover, in 1996
the Bureau signed an agreement with Idaho Power Company, the FERC
licensee operating the Hells Canyon dams, in which the Bureau agreed to
limit flows in a way that ensures that salmon flow targets downstream on

the Snake River usually will not be met.488 Neither that agreement nor its
implementation has ever been subject to consultation, and environmentalists have sent the Bureau a notice of intent to sue under the ESA.489
The evasion of ESA consultation by FERC and the Bureau shows that,

while the ESA has subjected most salmon-damaging activities of the federal
government to consultation, the statute is not yet truly comprehensive in

subjecting salmon-damaging activities to biological scrutiny. Since the ESA
does not authorize NMFS to make recalcitrant agencies consult, the burden

to ensure compliance is apparently left to environmentalists using the ESA's
citizen suit provision.490
F.

The Evolution ofNMFS as a Regulatory Agency

In the era before the ESA began to dominate salmon law and policy,
NMFS was an active member of the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Authority (CBFWA), an interagency group of federal, state, and tribal fish
485. See American Rivers et al., Notice ofintent to Suefor Violations of the EndangeredSpecies Act
3 (1997) [hereinafter Notice ofIntent to Sue].
486. NMFS recently wrote a draft BiOp on the Bureau's Snake River operations, but that analysis
only considers efforts to obtain the 427,000 acre-feet of water for fish flows called for in NMFS's
existing BiOp; it does not evaluate the effects of Bureau project operations on listed salmon. See
National Marine Fisheries Serv., DraftBiological Opinionon Bureau ofReclamation Operationsand
Maintenance of Its Projects in the Snake River Basin Above Lower Granite Dam (Apr. 8, 1999)
<http:/Iwww.nwr.noaagov/lhydrop/page.pdf>.
487. See Notice ofIntent to Sue, supranote 485, at 3.
488. See id. at4.
489. See id. In NaturalResources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998), the
court held that the Bureau's failure to complete section 7 consultation prior to renewing water supply
contracts violated the ESA, and that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering that the
contracts be rescinded. See also O'Neill v. UnitedStates, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995), where the court
ruled that Bureau contract language absolved the government of liability for its failure to deliver the full
contractual amount of water due to a shortage caused by statutory environmental mandates.
490. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
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and wildlife agencies in the region. In 1990, CBFWA argued that the
Northwest Power Planning Council should adopt a schedule of biologically
based minimum streamflows as part of its Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program, but the Council refused.49' Whereas CBFWA called for
flows of 140,000 cubic feet per second in the Snake River during the peak
spring migration season, the Council's 1991 program included only 85,000
cubic feet per second, just sixty percent of what CBFWA recommended.4 92
One might have expected that once NMFS was transformed from a
commenting agency into a decisionmaking agency by virtue of the salmon
listings under the ESA, the agency would move to implement the flow
recommendations it had earlier supported. Yet, once vested with
decisionmaking authority, NMFS surprisingly saw the merit in lower flows,
calling for flow "targets" ofjust 85,000 to 100,000 cubic feet per second in
the Snake during the spring migration season. NMFS also sanctioned a
system in which most juvenile fish are removed from the river and
transported by track or barge downstream. 493 Because NMFS never
attempted to explain why the CBFWA flows were biologically unjustified,
one possible inference is that, once NMFS obtained decisionmaking
authority, the agency biologists who subscribed to the CBFWA flows were
supplanted by more politically savvy agency managers. The numerous
eleventh-hour compromises that NMFS made in its 1995-99 hydropower
BiOp4 94 reinforced the impression that NMFS made decisions based on
nonbiological factors. How this decisionmaking is consistent with the ESA
is hardly clear.

491. See Blumm & Simrin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 4, at 707-08 (proposed flows); Blumm,
Saving Idaho 's Salmon, supra note 222, at 690-96 (describing the Council's 1991 amendments).
492 See Blumm & Simin, Unraveling Parity, supra note 4, at 708; Blumm, Saving Idaho s Salmon,
supra note 222, at 690. In 1994, the Council approved program amendments which included "sliding
scale" flows of 85,000 to 140,000 cubic feet per second in the Snake River during the peak migration
season, varying depending on water years. Those flows have never been implemented by project
operators, however, in part because the operators have assumed that the flows NMFS called for under
the ESA, see supra notes 244, 249-50, took precedence. See Blumm et aL., Beyond Parity,supra note
221, at 52 (discussing 1994 amendments), 61 n.253 (discussing questions about program's
enforceability), 64-65 (arguing that Council's program is no less enforceable than ESA BiOps).
493. See Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supra note 221, at 65 (discussing flows), 71-73 (discussing
the transportation program).
494. See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
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G.

The Vague Substance ofBiOps

Despite the ESA's reputation as a statute with more substance than
process, the BiOps studied in this article include a great deal of process. The
hydropower BiOp included numerous studies aimed at producing
information useful to NMFS in making its promised 1999 decision on
whether to continue to
truck and barge juvenile salmon or to call for
4
breaching some dams. 11
The habitat BiOp's reliance on "streamlining" has interjected a
considerable amount of pre-BiOp process into ESA consultation.4 96
Moreover, sometimes the substance that does appear in the BiOps is less
than meets the eye. For example, the hydropower BiOp sets flow
"targets. 497 The enforceability of these targets is highly unclear; they
appear to be aspirational goals, not mandatory requirements.
Other apparently substantive provisions have been creatively interpreted
by NMFS to remove their substantive bite. For example, by interpreting
"economic mitigation" to mean a prerequisite to implementing the John Day
drawdown, NMFS effectively made that measure unenforceable.49 8 Finally,
NMFS has largely ignored some issues, such as how tolerant a BiOp will
be toward environmental risk. In his review of hydropower BiOps, Judge
Marsh twice remarked that he questioned the willingness of NMFS to
tolerate a considerable amount of risk, although in the second case he
declined to strike down NMFS's BiOp.49
H.

The UncertainStandardfor Species Jeopardy

Related to the issue of NMFS's tolerance for environmental risk is the
agency's apparent willingness to accept fairly modest probabilities for
species recovery. Because the ESA does not define the term jeopardy,
NMFS has been using different probabilities on an ad hoc basis in its
BiOps. In the hydropower BiOps, for example, NMFS required a "high
probability" of both survival and recovery until the 1995-99 BiOp, when
495. See supra notes 263-64, 272, 426-32, and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
498. See supra note 253, infra notes 516-23, and accompanying text.

499. See Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 897-99
(D. Or. 1994) (ruling that NMFS's discounting of "worst case" risks in modeling was arbitrary and
capricious); American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 96-00384-MA, at 26 (D. Or. Apr.
3, 1997) (quoted supra text accompanying note 267).
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the agency began to differentiate between survival and recovery and
required only a "moderate to high probability" of recovery."' This
translated into a seventy-percent probability of survival, but just a fifty- to
seventy-percent chance of recovery. 0 1 NMFS offered no explanation of
why these probabilities were sufficient to avoid jeopardy, nor the reason
why it began to distinguish between survival and recovery. Neither did
NMFS attempt to explain why it eliminated the twenty-four-year period for
measuring recovery. 2 These unexplained shifts in position led to a
lawsuit 3 and created the suspicion that NMFS was willing to change
standards to avoid having to require more-than-minimal changes in the
status quo of hydroelectric operations, something Judge Marsh earlier
accused NMFS of doing." 4 The Ninth Circuit affinned NMFS's reduced
probability standard for achieving recovery, however, noting that the
applicable regulation contained no quantitative measure, that its interpretation in the Hydro BiOp was case-specific, and that it was the product
of a reasoned approach to scientific uncertainty. 55
.

The Failureto Accountfor CriticalHabitat

NMFS's salmon BiOps either ignore the ESA directive not to adversely
affect a species' critical habitat, or they treat it as the equivalent of the
requirement to avoid species jeopardy.0 6 Yet these are two distinct ESA
obligations.0 7 NMFS's failure to consider separately the effects of proposed
actions on critical habitat was the subject of a court challenge.
Environmentalists argued to the Ninth Circuit that the statute, regulations,
and agency interpretations all reflect an intent to avoid adversely affecting
critical habitat and to provide listed salmon with additional protection
beyond that provided by the no jeopardy standard. 8 However, the Ninth
500. See supranotes 247, 254-55, and accompanying text.
501. See, eg., 1995 BiOp, supranote 249, at 134 (discussing Snake River fall chinook).
502. See supranote 256 and accompanying text.

503. See supranotes 265-73 and accompanying text.
504. See supra text accompanying note 235.
505. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159, slip op. at 9-10 (9th

Cir. Mar. 8, 1999) (mem.).
506. See, e.g., 1995 BiOp, supra note 249, at 82; Umpqua Consultation Letter, supranote 426, at 22.
507. The ESA and the implementing regulations specifically require that federal agencies must ensure
that their actions do not adversely modify designated critical habitat See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2),
(b)(3)(A) (1994); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g) (1998).
508. See Brief for Appellants at 17-27, American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., (9th Cir.
1998) No. 97-36159 [hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
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Circuit rejected the challenge."0 9 This judicial lack of interest seems to have
sanctioned NMFS's continued indifference to effects on designated critical
habitat in its BiOps. As one commentator explained, "[tihe apparent
insignificance of the critical habitat process in the Columbia appears
paradoxical in light of the Endangered Species Act's express policy to take
an ecosystem perspective in implementing the Act."5' 0
J.

The "Streamlining"of the ConsultationProcess

The MOA authorizing "streamlining" of the consultation process... has
reduced the significance of the content of BiOps, as much of the mitigation
has become the product of negotiations among interagency "level one
teams" that inform the action agency's biological assessment 12 The result
in the case of the Umpqua timber sales was that NMFS used "streamlining"
essentially to rubberstamp the biological assessments, imposing no new
significant requirements as a result of its review.'
There is nothing in the ESA that expressly forbids using "streamlining"
to produce biological assessments with mitigation measures, enabling an
agency action to avoid species jeopardy or adverse modification to critical
habitat The upshot of "streamlining," however, is to place greater emphasis
on interagency negotiations than on the biological expertise of a consulting
agency like NMFS. The product of these negotiations is a written biological
assessment, but the interagency negotiations are entirely off the record.
While it is true that the current consultation process authorized by section
7 of the ESA does not envision a role for public involvement, "streamlining" further reduces the public role; the public is not allowed even a
509. SeeAmerican Rivers v. NationalMarinesFisheriesServ., No. 97-36159, slip op.at 6-7 ("NMFS
reasonably explained the close relationship between jeopardy and critical habitat and identified certain
effects of the dam operations (e.g., reduction of water velocity and increase in water temperature) that
both jeopardize the species themselves and adversely modify the species' critical habitat.... Given
NMFS's expertise in this area, the nature of the proposed action (dam operations), and the species'
habitat at issue here, we cannot say that NMFS's conclusion in the 1995 BiOp that the jeopardy analysis

'encompasses' the critical habitat analysis was arbitrary and capricious.").

510. Volkman, supra note 219, at 58-59 ("If the Endangered Species Act were focused first and
foremost on protecting ecosystems functions, the critical habitat process might identify the fundamental
conditions toward which the Endangered Species Act process would be geared. However, this is not
what has happened in the Columbia. Rather, decisions are aimed at reducing salmon mortality levels at

various points in the salmon migration, which is consistent with a focus on listed species rather than the
ecological processes on which species depend.").
511. See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.

512. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
513. Seesupranotes 426-30 and accompanying text.
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glimpse at interagency disagreements that might exist between the action
agency and the consulting agency. Thus, although "streamlining" may
reduce charges that consulting agency BiOps are blocking developments, 1 4
there is little to suggest that it will improve the biological effectiveness of
the measures adopted as a result of the ESA consultation process.
K

The Failureto Implement BiOps

Continuing a tradition established by the Northwest Power Planning
Council, which for years made no attempt to enforce salmon-protective
provisions in its Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,1 5 NMFS has
not been a vigilant enforcer of the provisions in its BiOps. The most
notorious example is the requirement in NMFS's 1995-99 hydropower
BiOp calling for a drawdown of the John Day reservoir to near-minimum
operating pool, or the minimum elevation at which Congress authorized the
reservoir to be operated.1 6 The Corps of Engineers has never implemented
this measure because NMFS conditioned implementation on providing
"economic mitigation" to parties that would be adversely affected by the
measure, such as irrigators who would need to extend their pumps to reach
the lowered reservoir. The Corps concluded it possessed no authority to
provide such mitigation." 7
Although the Ninth Circuit ruled that an action agency like the Corps
may deviate from NMFS's prescriptions, the court made clear that any such
deviation was permissible only where the agency had adopted "alternative,
reasonably adequate steps to insure the continued existence of any" listed
species." 8 The John Day drawdown would produce biological benefits
equivalent to augmenting streamflows with three million acre-feet of
storage water (over half the active storage behind the Grand Coulee

514. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
515. See, e.g., Blumm & Simrin, UnravelingParity,supra note 4, at 684,688-89, 726,738.
516. See Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supra note 221, at 55 n. 2 03 (defining minimum operating
pool), 66-67 n.291 (discussing the John Day drawdown).
517. See Brief for Appellants, supranote 508, at 28; North Pacific Div., U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
Record ofDecision on ReservoirRegulation and ProjectOperation, 1995 and Future Years 14(1995).
The Bonneville Power Administration, an agency that once concluded that it had implied authority to
fund a $7 billion nuclear power plant construction program, also concluded that it possessed no authority
to fund "economic mitigation" measures. See Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supra note 22 1, at 67 n.29 1.
518. Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988). In Akutan, the court
specifically determined that the agency had taken such steps, and that as a result, the remaining risk to
the listed species from the agency's action was "virtually nonexistent." Id. at 1194.
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Dam),5 19 but the Corps produced no alternative measures with any remotely
comparable benefits to migrating salmon. Failure to implement this measure
seems a clear violation of the ESA, as environmentalists argued before the
Ninth Circuit.52 The court, however, disagreed. 2 1 Thus, NMFS's sensitivity
to the potential adverse economic effects of its BiOp, coupled with action

agency claims of lack of authority to fund measures to protect economic
interests, 22 have apparently blocked implementation of a measure that

independent scientists have suggested could produce significant biological
benefits.5
L.

3

The ESA and the ProductionofScientific Information

The ESA requires decisionmaking based on the "best scientific... data
' How to develop the best available scientific information has
available."524

been a continuing source of concern. Under the Northwest Power Act, the
Northwest Power Planning Council established an Independent Scientific
Group and asked it to evaluate its salmon restoration program.5" The
scientists produced a detailed report in 1996 that criticized the Council's
program and called for "normative" river conditions, including drawdowns

of mainstem reservoirs to natural river levels and less reliance on technical

519. See 1995 BiOp, supranote 249, at 114.
520. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 508 at 28-32. In Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376,
1385-86 (9th Cir. 1987), the court ruled that the Corps's failure to carry out a mitigation measure
prescribed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service resulted in the Corps violating section 7(a)(2).
521. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159, slip op. at 7-8 (9th Cir.
Mar. 8, 1999) (mem.) ("The [Corps] has been unable to secure mitigation because Congress has
expressed doubts about the efficiency of the drawdown and has frozen funding pending further studies.
Thus the failure to draw down the reservoir does not violate [the ESA]. Indeed, the [Corps] would
arguably violate the express terms of [the BiOp and the statute] if it proceeded with the drawdown in
the absence of required mitigation."). The court also rejected the environmentalists' request for a
reinitiation of consultation if the drawdown did not occur, ruling that the relevant ESA regulation (50
C.F.R. § 402.16(c) (1998)) requires reinitiation of consultation only when an action is substantially
modified in a manner not considered by the BiOp. The court determined that the 1995 BiOp "clearly
contemplated operation of John Day at greater that [minimum operating pool] for an indeterminate
period before the necessary mitigation could be secured." Id at 8.
522. See supranote 517 and accompanying text.
523. See Return to the River , supra note 281, at 268-69, 513 (calling for drawdowns of mainstem
reservoirs, like John Day and McNary, to restore alluvial reaches for mainstem spawning), discussed
in Blumm et al.,Beyond Parity,supra note 221, at 114-15.
524. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
525. Like NMFS, the Northwest Power Planning Council must make decisions based on the best
available science. See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (1994).
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fixes like hatcheries and barge and truck transport.52 6 Some months before
completion of this report, NMFS and the Council signed an interagency
agreement consolidating their scientific advisory panels into an Independent
Scientific Advisory Board to advise both agencies." 7 The board presumably
will have an influence on NMFS's revised BiOp on Columbia Basin
hydroelectric operations, especially the critical decision due in late 1999 of
whether to continue barge and truck transport." 8
NMFS's existing BiOp on hydroelectric operations established a
scientific process, the Plan for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH),
specifically designed to help the agency make its impending 1999
decision. 29 In 1998, the PATH scientists produced several reports
indicating that from a scientific perspective, the best chance of restoring
Columbia Basin salmon lies in a "natural river option" of breaching dams
and eliminating the current transportation program.53 For example, the
PATH scientists estimated that the natural river option would produce a
nearly 100% probability of recovering Snake River chinook, while the
existing transportation program would actually decrease the chances of
recovery.53 ' Whether these scientific judgments will prove decisive remains
to be seen, but the PATH process has undoubtedly improved the quality of
science available to NMFS.
M.

The Myth That the ESA Is Economically Insensitive

A widespread complaint about the ESA is that the statute emphasizes
species protection to the exclusion of economic considerations.532 The
decisions studied in this Article seriously question the accuracy of those
526. See Blumm et al., Beyond Parity,supranote 221, at 112-17; see alsoVolkman, supra note 219,
at 64-65.
527. See National Marine Fisheries Serv. & Northwest Power Planning Council, Agreement
Regardingthe Independent Scientific Advisory Board(1996).
528. See supranotes 263-64, 272, and accompanying text.
529. See 1995 BiOp, supra note 249, at 6. The PATH scientists are specifically concerned with
advising NMFS on the science that will support its revised BiOp on hydroelectric operations, and their
studies are subject to peer review. The Independent Scientific Advisory Board has a broader mandate,
to advise NMFS and the Northwest Power Planning Council, see supranote 525 and accompanying text,
on all aspects of salmon restoration efforts, and its studies are not peer reviewed. There is apparently no
overlap in the membership of the two scientific advisory bodies. Conversation between Greg Corbin and
Daniel Rohlf, in Portland, Or. (Apr. 2, 1999).
530. See Blumm et al., The CaseforDamBreaching,supra note 272, at 1016, 1018-23.
531. See id. at 10 13-20 (discussing PA THReport, supra note 277, at 24).
532. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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allegations. For example, in the numerous eleventh-hour compromises that
NMFS made in formulating the 1995-99 BiOp on hydroelectric operations,
none favored salmon.533 In its concurrence to the biological assessments on
the Umpqua timber sales, NMFS approved the sales even though it admitted
that the existing state of salmon habitat in the area was unsatisfactory, and
the timber harvests would further degrade the area."' These decisions
cannot be explained on biological grounds. NMFS apparently believes that
the ESA affords the agency sufficient flexibility to take into account the
economic benefits of current Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations535 or
the nine timber sales at issue in the Umpqua Basin. As Congress considers
the advisability of amending the ESA, it should carefully evaluate the
statute's demonstrated flexibility to accommodate economic concerns,
which these case studies reveal.
V.

CONCLUSION

The advent of the ESA era in salmon restoration has forever changed
both the implementation of the statute and land and water use
decisionmaking in the Northwest. Whether the new era has actually
produced changes that will benefit salmon runs is far less certain.
The salmon's legacies to ESA implementation are numerous. First, to
manage the listing process, NMFS invented the ESU concept, which limited
the salmon populations eligible for listing to those considered evolutionarily
significant.536 Not only does the ESU concept arguably emphasize genetics
at the expense of ecological considerations,3 but NMFS's decision to adopt
the policy created some inconsistency with FWS, whose interpretation of
"distinct population segments" is not dominated by genetic
considerations.53
A second change to the implementation of the ESA as a result of the
salmon listings was NMFS's adoption of "streamlining" to speed up the
533. See supra notes 249-60 and accompanying text.
534. See supra notes 426-30 and accompanying text

535. There is, however, some question ofjust how costly it would be to change current Columbia
Basin hydroelectric operations to allow for the breaching of lower Snake River dams. See Blumm et al.,
The Casefor Dam Breaching,supra note 272, at 1023-31 (discussing various cost estimates of dam
breaching, two of which concluded that there would be net economic benefit if lower Snake River dams
were removed, and none of which concluded that dam breaching was economically infeasible).
536. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text
537. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text
538. See supra note 181.
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process of consultation." The result of "streamlining," which is unlikely
to be confined to Northwest salmon, was that about three-quarters of the
ESA consultations subject to streamlining culminated not with a NMFS
BiOp, but with a NMFS summary concurrence approving mitigation
measures contained in an action agency's biological assessment. 40
Certainly there is a benefit to expedited procedures, but the net effect of
streamlining may be to emphasize NMFS's off-the-record negotiations with
action agencies in improving their assessments, instead of its biological
expertise as reflected in written BiOps. This reduction in publicly accessible
records offers insufficient assurance that biological considerations will
predominate in ESA consultation.
A third salmon legacy to ESA implementation concerns the use of multiyear BiOps, first initiated in the context of Columbia Basin hydroelectric
operations. 4 The institution of these long-term plans raises the stakes in
section 7 consultations by adding a significant temporal dimension for
ongoing activities. The resulting attention devoted to the multi-year BiOp
on hydroelectric operations encouraged NMFS to make numerous
compromises protecting economic concerns at the expense of salmon.542
Although these compromises arguably were inconsistent with the intent of
the ESA,543 courts have refused to reverse the compromises that NMFS
struck.5"
A fourth legacy of the salmon listings to ESA implementation involves
the use of the consultation process to enforce pre-existing ecosystem
management plans like the Northwest Forest Plan.545 These plans can
include multi-year BiOps, as evident from the Inland Land case.546 Perhaps
more significantly, NMFS appears to have employed consultation to
implement measures contained in its proposed (but never completed)
Columbia Basin salmon recovery plan.547 If implementing ecosystem plans
through section 7 consultation becomes commonplace, it is important that
the plans themselves be subject to consultation, as required by the Ninth
539. See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
541. See supratext accompanying and preceding note 236.
542. See supra notes 240-60 and accompanying text.
543. See supranotes 235, 238, and accompanying text.
544. See supranotes 267-73, 509, 521, and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 424-25, 428, and accompanying text.
546. See supra notes 441,460, and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 303, 306, 321, 348-50, 357, and accompanying text.
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Circuit in the PacificRivers Council decision. 8 It is. even more important
that they be specific enough to serve as a guide for subsequent actions.
A fifth contribution to ESA implementation from salmon restoration
concerns the definition of "best available" science. Judge Marsh refused to
accept NMFS's interpretation of that statutory mandate where the agency
had ignored the views of state and tribal biologists. 49 This indicates that the
ESA demands a pluralistic process of intergovernmental consultation in
arriving at best available science. NMFS appears to agree, establishing a
process designed to produce independent scientific review of its actions." 0
Whether NMFS will accept the recommendations of independent scientists
on tough issues like whether to breach the Lower Snake River dams is not
yet clear,5" but the process of obtaining independent scientific review now
seems well established.
If the salmon's effects on the ESA have been many and varied, the
ESA's contribution to salmon restoration has been less certain. There is no
question that the ESA listings have produced a massive amount of process,
' Even more process
albeit some of it now "streamlined."552
may be on the
way, with suggestions that NMFS will soon undertake a "mega-BiOp" in
which Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations, hatchery operations,
harvest, and habitat management all would be considered in the same
document. 53 However, all this process has yet to produce significant
improvement in Columbia Basin salmon runs: although there are some
indications that the juvenile salmon survival is increasing," there is as yet
no increase in adult spawners, the key to salmon recovery.
Part of the problem with the lack of substantive results is that despite all
the process, some damaging activities have escaped biological review. For
example, hydroelectric operations under existing FERC licenses would
seem to be an ongoing federal action requiring section 7 consultation,55 5 as
would Bureau of Reclamation water deliveries under existing contracts.5 6
548. See supra notes 406-13 and accompanying text.
549. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text
551. See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text.
552. See supra notes 396-401, 539-40, and accompanying text.
553. See Barry Espenson, FederalAgenciesPoint TowardNew BiOp, 33 Columbia Basin Bull. I
(Feb. 26, 1999) <www.nwppe.org/bulletin/bulI_33.htm>.
554. See Barry Espenson, NMFS Studies Show Smolt Srvival Gains,28 Columbia Basin Bull. 1 (Jan.
15, 1999) <http://www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull_28.htm>.
555. See supra notes 480-84 and accompanying text.
556. See supra notes 485-89.
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Yet neither type of activity has been subjected to consultation, and it may
be necessary once again557that citizens ask courts to order the agencies to
fulfill their ESA duties.
The largest impending substantive decision is NMFS's decision on
whether to continue artificially transporting juvenile salmon by truck and
barge, or to recommend breaching the four Lower Snake River dams to let
the fish migrate in the river.55 This determination, expected in late 1999,
may be the best indication of whether the ESA offers listed salmon anything
more than elaborate process and economically sensitive decisionmaking.
Although strong evidence exists that dam breaching is both the best means
to recover listed Columbia Basin salmon and economically affordable,559
there are early indications that NMFS will seek to avoid the political
controversy that would surround dam breaching and will continue barging
and trucking salmon. Equipped with judicial approval of its BiOp,
promising just a fifty percent chance of recovering listed salmon,5" and
about to prepare a "mega BiOp" that could shift some of the focus away
from hydropower to other sources of salmon mortality,56 ' NMFS appears to
have sufficient discretion to continue artificially transporting salmon
downstream. As a result, NMFS is unlikely to change materially the way the
Columbia and Snake Rivers flow, despite the failure of the trucking and
barging program to produce discernable improvements in salmon returns
over more than two decades.562
Perhaps the chief lesson from this study is that the ESA affords NMFS
sufficient authority to resolve scientific uncertainties in a way that allows
the pursuit of the politically palatable, instead of the biologically necessary.
VI. EPILOGUE
While this Article was being prepared for publication, NMFS released
a document that may signal the nature of the debate over the key decision
concerning the future of Columbia Basin salmon-the decision whether to
557. See supra note 490 and accompanying text.
558. See supra notes 263-64,277-79,528, 530-31, and accompanying text.
559. See Blumm et al., The Casefor Dam Breaching,supra note 272; Barry Espenson, A-Fish
Appendix TillAnswer Scientists, 37 Columbia Basin Bull. 1 (Apr. 2, 1999) <http.//www.nwppc.org/
buletin/bull_37.htm> (discussing March 22, 1999, letter signed by 200 scientists urging President
Clinton to support breaching of lower Snake River dams and return to "normative" river conditions).
560. See supra notes 255, 267,273, and accompanying text.
561. See supranote 479 and accompanying text.
562. See Blumm et al., The Casefor Dam Breaching,supra note 272, at 1014, 1017-23.
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breach the four lower Snake River dams or to continue barging and trucking
juvenile salmon around the dams.63 This April 14, 1999, study reiterates
what other scientific studies have concluded: that breaching the dams offers
the best chance of restoring the imperiled Snake River salmon runs."
However, while breaching is, in the words of the report, the "most riskaverse" alternative to restoring the salmon runs, the scientists stressed that
if certain assumptions changed, breaching might provide only "negligible
benefits" compared to leaving the dams intact and continuing with barging
and trucking salmon. 65 These assumptions concerned what the report
referred to as "differential delayed transportation mortality," which is
delayed mortality due to adverse effects of barging and trucking." The
report suggested that if the differential delayed mortality is assumed to be
low, the advantages of breaching are not so pronounced, and inferred that
uncertainties over the effects of transportation could be narrowed by a fiveto ten-year study. Even with such a study, however, the "answer still will
not be certain, and there is some risk that if the data reveal transportation
mortality is in fact substantial, the species [will] suffer an enhanced risk of
not meeting the survival criterion." 67 The report estimated that the overall
increased risk of extinction would be approximately eight percent, although
actual risks to localized stocks are likely to be higher, given their desperate
condition.6 8
Reaction to the report was predictable: politicians who have already
declared their opposition to dam breaching, like Senators Gorton (R-Wash.)
and Smith (R-Or.), quickly pointed to the need for more study before
563. See supra notes 263-64,272,495, 528, and accompanying text See general Bluinm et al.,
The
CaseforDam Breaching,supranote 272.
564. See Barry Espenson, A-Fish Report Stresses Uncertainties,39 Columbia Basin Bull. 1 (April
16, 1999) <httpil/www.nwppc.org/bulletin/bull 39.htm>, for a discussion ofaNMFS study entitledAn
Assessment ofLower Snake River Hydrosystem Alternatives on Survival andRecovery ofSnake River
Salmonids. The study, which will become the anadromous fish appendix in a Corps of Engineers
environmental impact statement on the effects of breaching the dams, was produced by scientists at

NMFS's Northwest Fisheries Science Center in Seattle. See id.
565. Id.
566. Id. Scientists assume that one reason that few adult salmon return to spawn, despite the high
percentage of juvenile salmon that survive trucking and barging, is that the physiological stress
associated with the experience of being artificially transported (due to collection and crowding in barges

and trucks) produces delayed mortalities. Scientists also assume that delayed mortalities occur due to
the transportation program's genetic selectivity, its disruption in salmon homing capabilities, and its
fostering of disease transmission. See Blumm et al., The CaseforDam Breaching,supranote 272, at
1009-10 & n.58.
567. Espenson, supra note 564 (quoting report's executive summary).

568. See id.
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breaching; environmentalists feared the report would lead to more
"paralysis by analysis."569 As the NMFS Regional Administrator has
recently written, the idea that the region seeks a science-based approach to
salmon recovery is a myth; people in fact practice "pick-andchoose... agenda-driven science advocacy" to bolster policies they
favor.57 The policy agenda that this report favors is maintenance of the
status quo: more study of the reasons why the twenty-year-old experiment
of barging and trucking of Columbia Basin salmon is failing to prevent the
species' slide toward extinction. Perhaps that agenda helps to explain why
state and tribal biologists were apparently excluded from drafting the
" ' Further, the PATH scientific group, which
report.57
NMFS created to
advise the agency on its decision of whether to continue trucking or barging
or to recommend dam breaching, never raised the issue of differential
delayed mortality in any of their studies.572 It is more than a little curious
that NMFS would discover this new reason to continue to study the twodecades-old experiment of artificially transporting salmon just as the study
time period under its existing BiOp is about to expire, and when virtually
all the science suggests that the best course of action to save the Snake
River runs is dam breaching.7 3 Perhaps NMFS is practicing its own form
of "agenda-driven" science. 4
Coupled with the deferential review the courts are giving NMFS
decisionmaking and NMFS's efforts to produce a "mega-BiOp" that may
de-emphasize the effect of hydroelectric operations,575 the new report may
give NMFS all the scientific "cover" the agency needs to continue "business
as usual" under the ESA. That is hardly good news for the endangered
Snake River salmon, which may become the first ESA-protected species to
be studied to death.

569. See Barry Espenson, A-Fish Report Gets Mixed Reaction, 39 Columbia Basin Bull. 2 (Apr. 16,
1999) <http://www.nwppe.org/bulletin/bull_39.htm>.
570. William Stelle, Jr., Overcoming the Seven Myths of ColumbiaRiver Salmon Recovery, 28 Envtl.
L. 493,499 (1998).
571. See Esperson, supra note 569 (quoting Ed Bowles, Idaho Department of Fish and Game's
Anadromous Fish Manager, who complained of "closed process"; and Earl Weber, Columbia River
Inter-Tribal Fish Commission fisheries scientist, who noted that "[t]he states and tribal [scientists] were
not allowed to see the document, let alone comment on it").
572. See Blumm et al., The CaseforDamBreaching,supra note 272, at 1020-23.
573. See id. at 10 12-23.
574. See supra note 570 and accompanying text.
575. See supra notes 267, 273, 509, 521 (deferential judicial review), 479 ("mega-BiOp"), and
accompanying text.

